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ABSTRACT 
 Natural and man-made disasters have altered the public safety paradigm by 
contributing to an increase in firearms sales, gun-carrying by the public, and a general 
relaxation of the rules of engagement in which citizens may employ deadly force. These 
conditions have made the landscape in which police, fire, and emergency services work 
potentially more dangerous. This thesis addresses how public safety agencies should 
evaluate and respond tactically, operationally, and strategically to the changing landscape 
caused by crisis events. It begins with an examination of two such crisis events, 
Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook, focusing on the gun-related outcomes of these 
events. The thesis then presents two hypothetical scenarios that incorporate these 
gun-related outcomes to contextualize them for public safety officers. The thesis then 
offers prescriptive recommendations for public safety agencies to manage disaster 
convergence of armed citizens, interact with schools where armed staff members are 
present, and build positive relationships with the gun-owning community. Finally, it 
concludes that interacting with armed citizens is a trend that will likely continue and that 
the best course of action is to plan for these challenges in advance of crisis events. 
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A detailed review of relevant literature has revealed that crisis events, such as mass 
shootings and natural disasters, have triggered dramatic changes in gun-related laws, 
policies, and social perceptions in the United States. Particularly following Hurricane 
Katrina and the Sandy Hook school shooting, citizens and legislators have called for either 
relaxing or strengthening gun controls.1 For example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
the federal government and several states passed legislation preventing the government 
from seizing citizens’ weapons during a disaster.2 Conversely, after the Sandy Hook school 
shooting, there were immediate calls to ban assault weapons, reduce the capacity of 
ammunition magazines, and require universal background checks.3  
Although the number of U.S. households with guns has decreased, recent 
observations and research further suggest that crisis events such as Hurricane Katrina and 
Sandy Hook may increase new gun sales and the demand for concealed-carry permits.4 
Research also indicates that this surge in gun sales correlates with an uptick in accidental 
firearm-related deaths, which might be expected given an increase in first-time gun 
buyers.5 Finally, crisis events like Sandy Hook also appear to drive legislation aimed at 
both strengthening and relaxing firearm restrictions.6 
 
1 James M. La Valle, “Rebuilding at Gunpoint: A City-Level Re-Estimation of the Brady Law and 
RTC Laws in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 18, no. 4 (December 2007): 
451–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403407299931; and Aaron Kupchik, John J. Brent, and Thomas J. 
Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton: More of the Same,” British Journal of Criminology 55, no. 6 
(November 2015): 1115–30, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv049. 
2 Allen Rostron, “Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control,” 
Maryland Law Review 67, no. 3 (2008): 526–29. 
3 Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 6th ed. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2015), 168–69. 
4 Massad Ayoob, “Lethal Force, Katrina’s Lessons: Selling the Right Stuff,” Shooting Industry 50, no. 
11 (November 2005): 16; and Phillip B. Levine and Robin McKnight, “Firearms and Accidental Deaths: 
Evidence from the Aftermath of the Sandy Hook School Shooting,” Science 358, no. 6328 (December 8, 
2017): 1324, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aan8179. 
5 Levine and McKnight, “Firearms and Accidental Deaths,” 1327. 
6 Matt Vasilogambros, “Since Sandy Hook, More NRA-Backed Gun Legislation Has Passed Than 
Laws to Restrict Guns,” Huffington Post, March 3, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hundreds-
of-new-state-gun-laws-most-expand-access_us_5a995f07e4b06a04fecca7e6. 
xvi 
Crisis events can be linked to other firearm-related social and policy trends such as 
stand-your-ground laws and calls for arming teachers.7 According to Spitzer, stand-your-
ground laws represent an expansion of preexisting “castle doctrine” rules, which generally 
allow a person to defend oneself without a “duty to retreat” to one’s home.8 Stand-your-
ground laws presume that the shooter has acted in self-defense, shifting the burden of proof 
from the defendant to the prosecution to prove that the shooter did not act in self-defense.9 
This shift in the burden of proof has complicated law enforcement’s investigations of 
civilian shootings and has correlated with an increase in homicides, both justifiable and 
otherwise.10 
Other examples of how crisis events and firearms have changed the landscape in 
which law enforcement and emergency services operate are visible in the post–Sandy Hook 
debates about arming schoolteachers and staff, as well as relaxing prohibitions on the 
carrying of firearms on school property.11 Meanwhile, the number of concealed weapon 
permits issued in the United States has increased rapidly, from approximately 2.4 million 
permits in 1999 to over 16 million in 2017.12 Americans continue to acquire concealed-
carry permits at dramatically higher rates—with the number of new permits being issued 
yearly growing from about 240,000 per year between 1999 and 2007 to a record 1.7 million 
new permits in 2017.13 
 
7 Joseph Giannell, “Second Amendment through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” Southern Regional 
Black Law Students Journal 2 (2007): 72–75; and Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of 
Newton,” 1126. 
8 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 85. 
9 Spitzer, 84. 
10 Spitzer, 87–88. 
11 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton,” 1118. One week after the Sandy Hook 
shooting, Wayne LaPierre, executive vice president of the NRA, uttered his now famous line—“The only 
thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun”—in his calls to Congress, urging them to 
increase funding for armed security at schools. 
12 John R. Lott, Concealed Carry Permit Holders across the United States: 2018 (Alexandria, VA: 
Crime Prevention Research Center, 2018), 7. 
13 Lott, 8. 
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Research has shown that the primary reason cited by gun owners for gun ownership 
is self-defense.14 Crisis events may provide examples of what some authors have termed a 
“belief in a dangerous world.”15 For example, Joseph Giannell affirms that Katrina 
provided a real-life example of when “gun ownership was one of the only accessible means 
for safety.”16 Furthermore, both Giannell and Crusto use Katrina as a backdrop to 
demonstrate the government’s ineptitude and corruption during crisis scenarios.17 
Likewise, according to Ladd, Gill, and Marszalek, a majority of college students who were 
in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina now express distrust in the ability of local, state, 
and federal government to meet the needs of citizens in a crisis.18 In this way, gun sales 
and ownership, especially in the aftermath of crisis events, may act as an informal 
barometer of the public’s faith in the government’s ability to protect the people. More 
recently, the failure of Broward County Deputy Scot Peterson to enter Marjory Stoneman 
High School, in Parkland, Florida, to subdue active shooter Nicholas Cruz has led to both 
outrage over the government’s inability to protect those in its care and an increase in gun 
sales.19 
The increase in the number of firearms, growth in the numbers of potentially armed 
people, the relaxation of the rules of engagement in the use of deadly force, and a lack of 
faith in the government’s ability to protect the citizenry have made the emergency-response 
landscape dangerous for law enforcement and emergency services personnel. These 
 
14 Giannell, “Through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” 72. 
15 Wolfgang Stroebe, N. Pontus Leander, and Arie W. Kruglanski, “Is It a Dangerous World out 
There? The Motivational Bases of American Gun Ownership,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
43, no. 8 (2017): 1071–85, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0146167217703952. 
16 Giannell, “Through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” 72. 
17 Mitchell F. Crusto, “State of Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited,” Loyola Law 
Review 61, no. 3 (2015): 486; and Giannell, “Through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” 73. 
18 Anthony E. Ladd, Duane A. Gill, and John Marszalek, “Riders from the Storm: Disaster Narratives 
of Relocated New Orleans College Students in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” Journal of Public 
Management & Social Policy 13, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 64–65. 
19 Amy Held, “Ex-Deputy Who Stayed Outside during Parkland Shooting Getting $8,702 Monthly 
Pension,” NPR, May 17, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/17/611923342/ex-
deputy-who-stayed-outside-during-parkland-shooting-getting-8-702-monthly-pens; and Polly Mosendz and 
Mira Rojanasakul, “Florida Went Gun Shopping after the Parkland Shooting,” Bloomberg, March 6, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-february-gun-sales/. 
xviii 
agencies are often caught between their responsibilities to respond effectively to victims of 
gun violence and this new landscape. Law enforcement is expected to enter scenes 
immediately with active shooters rather than to establish a perimeter and await a special 
weapons and tactics unit.20 Firefighters and ambulance personnel can no longer remain at 
a safe distance until law enforcement secures the scene—they are now expected to deploy 
“rescue task forces” alongside law enforcement to rescue victims at mass shootings, even 
while the perpetrator may still be at large.21 Law enforcement has begun issuing rifles and 
improved ammunition for officer safety.22 There are now recommendations that 
firefighters and ambulance personnel carry body armor and receive training in specific 
gunshot-related trauma care, including the use of tourniquets.23  
This thesis thoroughly examines these issues, contextualizing them through the use 
of two hypothetical scenarios involving both an active shooter scenario with armed citizens 
and a natural disaster in which the armed residents resist the authority’s instructions. It also 
introduces the framework of “disaster convergence” in which people, information, and 
equipment inevitably move toward disaster scenes during crisis events.24 The outcomes of 
this well-documented phenomenon are reexamined in light of an expanded gun-carrying 
population operating with relaxed rules of the civilian use of deadly force.  
Finally, an analysis of the scenarios then drives prescriptive recommendations that 
address the strategic, operational, and tactical policies surrounding disaster convergence, 
 
20 Mike Wood, “The Next Generation of Active Shooter Response,” Police One, January 3, 2019, 
https://www.policeone.com/active-shooter/articles/482527006-The-next-generation-of-active-shooter-
response/. 
21 Dan Danaher, “Mistaken Assumptions and Lessons Learned during Rescue Task Force Training,” 
Police One, February 20, 2018, https://www.policeone.com/police-products/tactical/articles/471140006-
Mistaken-assumptions-and-lessons-learned-during-rescue-task-force-training/; and Mike Wood, “Fixing 
the Rescue Task Force,” Police One, August 20, 2018, https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-
armor/articles/479385006-Fixing-the-Rescue-Task-Force/. 
22 Mike Callahan, “4 Ways PDs Can Justify a Patrol Rifle Program,” Police One, May 2, 2018, 
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/articles/471820006-4-ways-PDs-can-justify-a-patrol-
rifle-program/. 
23 Danaher, “Mistaken Assumptions and Lessons Learned.” 
24 Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behaviors in Disasters: A Problem in Social 
Control, Disaster Study No. 9 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council, 1957), https://archive.org/details/convergencebehav00fritrich. 
xix 
an increasingly armed citizenry, and armed school staff members. This thesis concludes 
that the government must establish and maintain the trust of armed citizens to reduce the 
likelihood of negative interactions with them. It further suggests that government agencies 
should view and treat the gun-owning community as it would any other sub-community in 
their jurisdictions to build trust with them. Finally, this thesis provides specific 
recommendations on ways that law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service 
agencies can build strong relationships with gun owners to increase their own safety and 
that of their community. The purpose of this thesis is to provide public safety agency 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION: MORE GUNS, MORE PROBLEMS? 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 62 of 66 law enforcement 
officers who died in 2016 during felonious incidents were killed with firearms.1 This figure 
is the greatest number of firearm-related deaths in law enforcement since 2011 and the 
second highest since 2007.2 While law enforcement officers make up the majority of 
emergency personnel who die from firearms, firefighters and emergency services workers 
are not immune from job-related gun violence. On the morning of Christmas Eve, 2012, 
for example, two firefighters were shot and killed in an ambush-style attack at the site of a 
deliberately set fire in New York state.3 Furthermore, news stories indicate that even 
ambulance crews, whose job is to save lives, have been deliberately targeted with firearms.4  
Law enforcement and emergency services personnel receive training on how to 
mitigate risk to themselves and their community. However, the substance of such training 
must evolve in response to changes in society and, thus, to the threat landscape. For 
example, after the Columbine shooting in 1999, law enforcement transitioned from waiting 
for special weapons and tactics (SWAT) to arrive and engage the shooter to patrol officers 
engaging the shooter as soon as possible.5 Outrage after the delay in allowing fire and 
emergency medical services (EMS) to enter the Los Angeles International Airport 
following a mass shooting prompted fire and EMS to train to enter hostile environments 
 
1 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and 
Assaulted, 2016 (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017), 2, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/ 
2016. 
2 “Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Type of Weapon, 2007–2016,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, accessed July 22, 2019, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016/tables/table-28.xls. 
3 Victoria Freile and Doug Stanglin, “4 Firefighters Shot, 2 Killed at Webster, N.Y., Fire,” USA Today, 
December 24, 2012, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/24/webster-new-york-
firefighter-shot/1788917/. 
4 Jonece Star Dunigan, “Alabama Ambulance Crew Shot at While on Call,” EMS1, December 6, 2016, 
https://www.ems1.com/ambulances-emergency-vehicles/articles/149883048-Ala-ambulance-crew-shot-at-
while-on-call/. 




where a shooter may still be at large.6 Some emerging response models within law 
enforcement are beginning to consider the roles that armed citizens may play in these 
scenarios.7 However, as Michael Wood notes, the necessary evolution of these tactics 
comes about slowly in law enforcement and the fire service.8 
A review of the literature on crisis events suggests that mass shootings and natural 
disasters have been triggers for dramatic changes in gun-related laws, policies, and social 
perceptions in the United States. Particularly following Hurricane Katrina and the Sandy 
Hook school shooting, citizens and legislators called for either relaxing or strengthening 
gun controls.9 For example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the federal government and 
several states passed legislation preventing the government from seizing citizens’ weapons 
during a disaster.10 Conversely, after the Sandy Hook school shooting, there were 
immediate calls to ban assault weapons, reduce the capacity of ammunition magazines, and 
require universal background checks.11 Additionally, there were calls for arming 
schoolteachers and other employees to augment sworn school resource officers (SROs) or 
to defend schools without SROs on campus through a citizen-defender approach to 
protecting children.12 
 
6 Dan Weikel, “$25 Million Lawsuit in Death of TSA Officer Shot 12 Times at LAX,” Los Angeles 
Times, October 8, 2014, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lax-shooting-lawsuit-20141008-
story.html; and Mike Wood, “Fixing the Rescue Task Force,” Police One, August 20, 2018, https://www. 
policeone.com/police-products/body-armor/articles/479385006-Fixing-the-Rescue-Task-Force/. 
7 Wood, “The Next Generation of Active Shooter Response.” 
8 Wood. 
9 James M. La Valle, “Rebuilding at Gunpoint: A City-Level Re-Estimation of the Brady Law and 
RTC Laws in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 18, no. 4 (December 2007): 
451–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403407299931; and Aaron Kupchik, John J. Brent, and Thomas J. 
Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton: More of the Same,” British Journal of Criminology 55, no. 6 
(November 2015): 1115–30, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azv049. 
10 Allen Rostron, “Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control,” 
Maryland Law Review 67, no. 3 (2008): 526–29. 
11 Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 6th ed. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2015), 
168–69. 
12 Sherman Lakeith Winston, “Equipping Teachers with Firearms to Promote Safety in U.S. Public 
High Schools” (PhD diss., Walden University, 2016), https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/ 
3219/. 
3 
Some statistics show that the overall number of households with guns in them is at 
an all-time low.13 However, gun sales, as measured by the annual number of firearm 
background checks conducted by the FBI’s National Instant Check System, have steadily 
risen since 2001 and are currently over three times greater than they were before 2001.14 
The decrease in the number of households with firearms combined with the dramatic 
increase in gun sales seems to indicate that existing gun owners are purchasing more and 
more firearms, creating a high concentration of gun ownership. 
Recent observations and research further suggest that crisis events may increase 
new gun sales and the demand for concealed carry permits.15 Research by Levine and 
McKnight highlights that the majority of new firearms sold after crisis events, such as 
Sandy Hook, may be to first-time gun buyers.16 Their research also indicates that this surge 
in gun sales may at least correlate with an uptick in accidental firearm-related deaths, which 
might be expected given an increase in first-time—and thus less experienced—gun 
buyers.17 In this way, gun sales and ownership, especially in the aftermath of crisis events, 
may act as an informal barometer of the public’s faith in the government’s ability to protect 
the people. 
Crisis events such as Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook can be linked to other 
firearm-related social and policy trends. On October 1, 2005, in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, the state of Florida passed a new type of self-defense law that has become known 
as the “stand-your-ground” law.18 According to Spitzer, stand-your-ground laws represent 
an expansion of the preexisting “castle doctrine,” which generally allows a person to 
 
13 Tom W. Smith and Jaesok Son, Trends in Gun Ownership in the United States, 1972-2014 (Chicago: 
Non-Partisan Objective Research Council, University of Chicago, 2015), 3, http://www.norc.org/PDFs/ 
GSS%20Reports/GSS_Trends%20in%20Gun%20Ownership_US_1972-2014.pdf. 
14 “NICS Firearm Checks: Month/Year,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 30, 2018, 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nics_firearm_checks_-_month_year.pdf/view. 
15 Massad Ayoob, “Lethal Force, Katrina’s Lessons: Selling the Right Stuff,” Shooting Industry 50, no. 
11 (November 2005): 16; and Phillip B. Levine and Robin McKnight, “Firearms and Accidental Deaths: 
Evidence from the Aftermath of the Sandy Hook School Shooting,” Science 358, no. 6328 (December 8, 
2017): 1324, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aan8179. 
16 Levine and McKnight, “Firearms and Accidental Deaths,” 1325. 
17 Levine and McKnight, 1327. 
18 Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control, 84. 
4 
defend oneself without a “duty to retreat” to one’s home.19 Florida’s stand-your-ground 
law extends these rights to people using lethal force to defend themselves outside their 
homes.20 Stand-your-ground laws presume that the shooter has acted in self-defense. This 
presumption shifts the burden of proof from the defendant to the prosecution to prove that 
the shooter did not act in self-defense. This shift in the burden of proof complicates law 
enforcement’s investigations of civilian shootings. For example, Florida’s stand-your-
ground laws were likely the reason that charges were not filed against George Zimmerman 
in the 2012 shooting of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed African-American youth and may 
have contributed to a lackluster investigation of these events by the police.21 While 
controversial, Spitzer’s research reveals significant increases in justifiable homicide rates 
and an insignificant decrease in violent crime in states that have enacted stand-your-ground 
laws.22  
Other examples of how crisis events and firearms have changed the landscape in 
which law enforcement and emergency services operate are visible in the post–Sandy Hook 
debates about arming schoolteachers and staff, as well as relaxing prohibitions on the 
carrying of firearms on school property.23 This national trend toward expanding access to 
firearms has resulted in the enactment of almost 400 “pro-gun” pieces of legislation that 
relax laws on who can carry firearms, where guns can be carried, and when lethal force can 
be used.24 Meanwhile, the number of concealed weapon permits issued in the United States 
has increased rapidly from approximately 2.4 million permits in 1999 to over 16 million in 
2017.25 Americans continue to acquire permits to carry a concealed weapon (CCW)—with 
 
19 Spitzer, 85. 
20 Spitzer, 84. 
21 Spitzer, 85–86. 
22 Spitzer, 87–89. 
23 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton,” 1118. 
24 Matt Vasilogambros, “Since Sandy Hook, More NRA-Backed Gun Legislation Has Passed Than 
Laws to Restrict Guns,” Huffington Post, March 3, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hundreds-
of-new-state-gun-laws-most-expand-access_us_5a995f07e4b06a04fecca7e6. 
25 John R. Lott, Concealed Carry Permit Holders across the United States: 2018 (Alexandria, VA: 
Crime Prevention Research Center, 2018), 7. 
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the number of new permits being issued yearly growing from about 240,000 per year 
between 1999 and 2007 to a record 1.7 million new permits in 2017.26 
These seemingly contradictory statistics suggest a changing dynamic in gun 
ownership in the United States. While, overall, there may be a fewer number of households 
with firearms in them, those with firearms are buying more and more of them as well as 
acquiring the permits and licenses necessary to carry their firearms outside the home. 
Furthermore, crisis events seem to motivate those who have not previously owned firearms 
to acquire them. This growing access to firearms comes at a time when the public may have 
diminished faith in all levels of government to protect the people.  
The lessons from Hurricane Katrina are still on citizens’ minds. Joseph Giannell 
affirms that Katrina provided a real-life example of when “gun ownership was one of the 
only accessible means for safety” due to looting and the defection or criminal misconduct 
of the New Orleans Police Department.27 Furthermore, both Giannell and Crusto use 
Katrina as a backdrop to demonstrate the government’s ineptitude and corruption during 
crisis scenarios.28 Likewise, according to Ladd, Gill, and Marszalek, a majority of college 
students in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina now expresses distrust in the ability of 
local, state, and federal government to meet the needs of citizens in a crisis.29 More 
recently, the failure of Broward County Deputy Scot Peterson to enter Marjory Stoneman 
High School, in Parkland, Florida, to subdue active shooter Nicholas Cruz has led to 
outrage over law enforcement’s inability to protect those in their care.30 
 
26 Lott, 8. 
27 Joseph Giannell, “Second Amendment through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” Southern Regional 
Black Law Students Journal 2 (2007): 73–74; and Mitchell F. Crusto, “State of Emergency: An Emergency 
Constitution Revisited,” Loyola Law Review 61, no. 3 (2015): 486. 
28 Crusto, “State of Emergency,” 486; and Giannell, “Through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” 73. 
29 Anthony E. Ladd, Duane A. Gill, and John Marszalek, “Riders from the Storm: Disaster Narratives 
of Relocated New Orleans College Students in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” Journal of Public 
Management & Social Policy 13, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 64–65. 
30 Amy Held, “Ex-Deputy Who Stayed Outside during Parkland Shooting Getting $8,702 Monthly 
Pension,” NPR, May 17, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/17/611923342/ex-
deputy-who-stayed-outside-during-parkland-shooting-getting-8-702-monthly-pens. 
6 
The increase in the number of firearms, growth in the numbers of potentially armed 
people, the relaxation of the rules of engagement in the use of deadly force, and a lack of 
faith in the government’s ability to protect the citizenry have made the emergency-response 
landscape dangerous for law enforcement and emergency services personnel. These 
agencies are often caught between their responsibilities to respond effectively to victims of 
gun violence and this new landscape. Law enforcement is expected to enter scenes 
immediately with active shooters rather than to establish a perimeter and await a SWAT 
unit.31 Firefighters and ambulance personnel can no longer remain at a safe distance until 
law enforcement secures the scene; they are now expected to deploy “rescue task forces” 
alongside law enforcement to rescue victims at mass shootings, even while the perpetrator 
may still be at large.32 Law enforcement has begun issuing rifles and improved ammunition 
for officer safety.33 There are now recommendations that firefighters and ambulance 
personnel carry body armor and receive training in specific gunshot-related trauma care, 
including the use of tourniquets.34 There is also a renewed emphasis on first responders 
maintaining a heightened level of situational awareness to prepare themselves mentally for 
a violent or armed encounter.35 
In summary, crisis events have altered Americans’ views on the ability of the 
government to protect them from threats, both real and perceived. Because of this changing 
landscape, it is critical to examine how crisis events will further affect the tactical, 
operational, and strategic plans that law enforcement and emergency services must make 
in response to evolving gun-related dynamics in the United States. Additionally, it is 
 
31 Wood, “The Next Generation of Active Shooter Response.” 
32 Dan Danaher, “Mistaken Assumptions and Lessons Learned during Rescue Task Force Training,” 
Police One, February 20, 2018, https://www.policeone.com/police-products/tactical/articles/471140006-
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34 Danaher, “Mistaken Assumptions and Lessons Learned.” 




essential to explore how local government agencies interact with gun owners in advance 
of emergencies that might result in encounters between law enforcement and armed private 
citizens. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should law enforcement and emergency services evaluate and respond to the 
tactical, operational, and strategic challenges that have emerged from the political and legal 
outcomes of Hurricane Katrina and the Sandy Hook school shooting (crisis events that 
prompted very different political and cultural responses but have broad implications for 
first responders)? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines the unintended consequences for law enforcement and 
emergency services of changes to gun-related laws and policies that have evolved in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook. These two events were selected because 
they represent watershed moments in American culture regarding the acquisition and 
possession of firearms by civilians. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina deepened the 
conversation about right-to-carry and stand-your-ground policies underpinned by a 
perception that the government was unable to protect the citizenry during and after the 
crises.36 Katrina also deepened gun enthusiasts’ perceptions that the government is willing 
to confiscate citizens’ firearms.37 The moral panic following the Sandy Hook shooting 
ignited the debate over arming teachers, supported (in part) by the good-guy-with-a-gun 
paradigm popular among proponents of self-defense.38 Connecticut’s ban on more than 
150 types of guns following the Sandy Hook shooting may have provided gun owners a 
similar backdrop to the confiscation of guns during Hurricane Katrina, not to mention proof 
 
36 Giannell, “Through the Eyes of the Impoverished,” 73. 
37 Giannell, 74. 
38 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton,” 1118–20. 
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of the government’s willingness to restrict firearms before and after a crisis event.39 
Together, these two events present some measurable social, legal, and policy responses in 
the wake of both man-made and natural crisis events. 
The principal source of information for this thesis consists of the literature available 
on legal changes, such as stand-your-ground laws, and policy changes, such as the arming 
of non-sworn school officials, which have occurred in the wake of crisis events such as 
Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook. Additional data come from law enforcement and 
government reports on recommended changes to policies and procedures for enhanced 
response to gun-related incidents. Finally, a review of media reporting and public opinion 
polls provides a holistic view of how Americans expect law enforcement and emergency 
services to respond to such events in the future. 
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II reviews the literature on motivations behind gun ownership in America. 
It also examines how crisis events such as Sandy Hook and Hurricane Katrina may have 
altered Americans’ perceptions of gun ownership. Finally, it reviews the literature 
surrounding the phenomenon of disaster convergence and sets the stage for its application 
in a setting of increased gun-carrying and relaxed rules of engagement for the civilian use 
of deadly force. 
Chapter III provides background material on these events in a sequential format 
designed to demonstrate their relevance, similarities, and differences. Each examination 
begins with an abbreviated background followed by a study of societal responses, such as 
perceptions of firearm use and ownership as well as the legislative and policy initiatives 
proposed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook. These policy and 
legislative outcomes form the boundaries of this thesis. The discussion and analysis 
highlight hypothetical scenarios that explore the new tactical, operational, and strategic 
 
39 Lori Mack, “What’s Been the Impact of Connecticut’s Gun Laws after Sandy Hook?,” Connecticut 
Public Radio, December 8, 2017, 2, http://www.wnpr.org/post/whats-been-impact-connecticuts-gun-laws-
after-sandy-hook. 
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landscape created by the gun-related legal, policy, and social responses to these crisis 
events.  
Chapter IV explores the hypothetical of a school shooting and the immediate 
community response, considering the convergence of multiple armed civilians and school 
staff along with the deployment of emergency services personnel. This scenario presents 
first responders with challenges involving target identification, resource allocation, and 
public messaging. The scenario examines methods for discouraging this kind of 
convergence reaction as well as tactics and techniques for managing the convergence of 
armed civilians on an active shooter scene while law enforcement is responding to the 
situation. 
Chapter V examines a public safety response to a natural disaster in which armed 
citizens, empowered by stand-your-ground laws, actively resist government assistance out 
of distrust of the government’s intentions and ability to help them. This scenario addresses 
public safety messaging during crisis events to populations, distrustful of the government, 
who feel empowered to use lethal force against first responders to defend themselves and 
their property. The purpose of these hypothetical scenarios is to illuminate the “new 
normal” and to project what challenges law enforcement and emergency services might 
face because of past crisis events. 
Following each scenario is an analysis of some of the significant points illustrated 
by the literature vis-à-vis the scenarios. This thesis acknowledges that using hypothetical 
scenarios might create generalizations that demonstrate correlation but not necessarily 
causation of many of the conditions that it describes. Nonetheless, the examination of the 
convergence of these firearm-related trends illustrates how the threat landscape facing law 
enforcement, fire, and EMS is changing and allows for the extrapolation of how these 
issues will confront public safety agencies.  
Chapter VI concludes with prescriptive recommendations for communities and 
their leadership in confronting the challenges illuminated in the scenarios at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  
10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous societal influences have created a robust American gun culture—and the 
problems that accompany it. This literature review explores some of the motivations 
surrounding gun ownership in America. It then goes on to examine how the crisis events 
of Hurricane Katrina and the Sandy Hook school shooting changed the American gun 
culture and altered the debate over guns and the public policies surrounding them. Finally, 
the literature review introduces the disaster phenomenon of convergence as well as the 
problem for public safety organizations and officers of armed citizens converging during 
crisis events. This literature review establishes a baseline from which strategic, operational, 
and tactical adjustments by law enforcement and emergency service agencies become 
necessary. 
A. WHO ARE GUN OWNERS, AND WHY DO THEY OWN GUNS? 
Joan Burbick asserts that the American gun culture and its frontier origins reinforce 
the idea that gun owners are people of action.40 Burbick uses examples ranging from 
Buffalo Bill’s Wild West Show to modern-day western-themed movies to reinforce the 
idea that gun owners are people who exhibit a bias for action.41 She identifies a culture of 
“frontier masculinity” in which the white, male hero “always gets his man, [and] always 
triumph[s].”42 Melzer agrees with Burbick regarding the frontier foundations of America’s 
gun culture, noting that the cultural philosophy of the National Rifle Association (NRA) 
and its members is one of “frontier masculinity” and a “do-it-yourself attitude.”43 Melzer 
goes on to state that those subscribing to the idea of frontier masculinity believe that “a 
 
40 Joan Burbick, Gun Show Nation: Gun Culture and American Democracy (New York: New Press, 
2006). Burbick’s book describes America’s romanticized frontier history of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
which has been portrayed as one of hard work and self-reliance, and where the good guy (often a white 
male) always gets his man. Burbick shows how these beliefs have been perpetuated by movies, media, and 
segments of the American gun-culture. 
41 Burbick, 7. 
42 Burbick, 13. 
43 Scott Melzer, Gun Crusaders: The NRA’s Culture War (New York: New York University Press, 
2009), 25. 
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country whose citizens have to rely on the government for personal safety or basic needs 
is a country that is lazy and apathetic, and ultimately undemocratic.”44 
Burbick and Melzer both characterize “fear” as a major contributor to gun 
ownership. NRA members, says Melzer, “fear losing their guns, and they fear losing their 
freedoms.”45 For NRA members, says Melzer, “freedom” is synonymous with minimal 
government intervention and a focus on self-reliance for basic needs such as self-defense. 
Meanwhile, Burbick associates gun owners’ fears with cultural issues ranging from post-
reconstruction racism to the rise of communism.46  
Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski offer a contrasting cultural perspective to that of 
Burbick and Melzer about Americans’ attachment to firearms. While Strobe, Leander, and 
Kruglanski find no clear indicators that gun ownership is related to real or specific threats, 
they trace gun ownership to a more diffuse concept of “belief in a dangerous world.”47 
According to the authors, individuals “see the world as a dangerous place, as society teeters 
on the brink of self-destruction from evil and violence.”48 Strobe, Leander, and 
Kruglanski’s dangerous-world concept parallels Melzer’s observation of fear as a prime 
motivation for gun ownership. 
The net result of Burbick’s, Melzer’s and Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski’s work 
is a framework through which public safety officers should view much of the gun-owning 
community. If Burbick and Melzer are correct in their assessments of gun owners, it is 
possible that individuals who view themselves as people of action, empowered by visions 
of frontier masculinity, will not likely sit idly by when dangerous events unfold around 
them. Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski’s “belief in a dangerous world” may provide such  
 
 
44 Melzer, 28. 
45 Melzer, 2. 
46 Burbick, Gun Show Nation, 19–29, 51. 
47 Wolfgang Stroebe, N. Pontus Leander, and Arie W. Kruglanski, “Is It a Dangerous World out 
There? The Motivational Bases of American Gun Ownership,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
43, no. 8 (2017): 1072, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0146167217703952. 
48 Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski, 1073. 
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individuals the rationale to arm themselves for their defense and the defense of others. 
Crisis events, even terrible one-offs such as Hurricane Katrina or Sandy Hook, may justify 
to some gun owners not only their possession of firearms but their use as well. Public safety 
agencies must address not only gun owners’ fears but also their responses to these fears to 
operate in the modern landscape. 
B. SANDY HOOK AS A CRISIS EVENT 
One of the sources of Americans’ “belief in a dangerous world” may be what 
Nicholas Johnson terms “episodic design incompetence”—specific events that fall outside 
the norm and illustrate the government’s inability to protect the citizenry.49 One such event 
was the Sandy Hook school shooting in 2012 in Newton, Connecticut, which resulted in 
the shocking deaths of 20 young children and six adults. This event has influenced the 
debate over the proper role of firearms in the United States and had numerous policy and 
legislative effects. 
Responses from the public following the Sandy Hook shooting focused on 
protecting schools and restricting firearms.50 According to Schildkraut and Muschert, no 
school shooting since the Columbine school shooting in 1999 has garnered the attention or 
remained relevant to the public for so long.51 Schildkraut and Muschert suggest that while 
school shootings can create “moral panic” among the public, the way the media “framed” 
the Sandy Hook shooting led to its prolonged presence as a news story.52 Specifically, they 
note that after Columbine, the media focused largely on the victims of the shooting.53  
 
 
49 Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski, “Is It a Dangerous World out There?”; and Nicholas J. Johnson, 
“Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder Problem Article and Essay,” Wake 
Forest Law Review 43 (2008): 850. 
50 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton,” 1118. 
51 Jaclyn Schildkraut and Glen W. Muschert, “Media Salience and the Framing of Mass Murder in 
Schools: A Comparison of the Columbine and Sandy Hook Massacres,” Homicide Studies 18, no. 1 (2014): 
29–39, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1088767913511458. 
52 Schildkraut and Muschert, “Framing of Mass Murder in Schools.” 
53 Schildkraut and Muschert, 31. 
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However, following Sandy Hook, the media spent much more time on the issues of the role 
of guns in society and gun control than on the victims.54 As a result, claim Schildkraut and 
Muschert, “Sandy Hook was seen as a reflection of broader social problems in the nation” 
and might have been one of the reasons that so many gun control propositions followed the 
shooting.55 Similarly, according to Rostron, the NRA was able to create a moral panic 
among gun owners following Hurricane Katrina by furthering the narrative of 
governmental gun confiscation and drawing attention away from the other tragedies of the 
hurricane.56 
In a separate article, Schildkraut, writing with Tiffany Cox-Hernandez, supports 
researcher Gary Kleck’s assessment that many of the proposed gun control schemes in the 
wake of school shootings would not have prevented the shooting or reduced the number of 
fatalities and injuries.57 They suggest that many of the gun control propositions promoted 
in the wake of Sandy Hook were intended to “ease the mind of citizens who fear[ed] future 
attacks and to provide assurance that something [was] being done to address gun 
violence.”58 This finding is consistent with the conclusions of Schildkraut and Muschert: 
“The response is to rush what can be considered ‘feel good’ or even ‘feel better’ legislation 
to the floor, little of which passes.”59 
Kupchick, Brent, and Mowen observe that events like Sandy Hook likely activated 
the “moral sensibilities” on the pro-gun side as well, citing NRA Executive Vice President 
Wayne LaPierre’s famous “good guy with a gun” statement.60 After a school shooting in 
California, one pro-gun supporter bluntly summed up his side of the debate, allegedly  
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56 Rostron, “Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality,” 524–31. 
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59 Schildkraut and Muschert, “Framing of Mass Murder in Schools,” 39. 
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saying, “Your dead kids don’t trump my constitutional rights.”61 Kupchick, Brent, and 
Mowen further observe that despite politicians’, educators’, and the public’s derision of 
LaPierre and the NRA’s “good guy with a gun” stance, it is the policy that has been 
implemented by schools across the nation.62 Furthermore, while hundreds of new gun laws 
have been enacted across the nation since Sandy Hook, most of them have loosened gun 
restrictions rather than tightening them.63  
The Sandy Hook school shooting also ignited the debate over the efficacy of arming 
schoolteachers and staff. According to Rostron, following his good-guy-with-a-gun 
comment, LaPierre and the NRA alluded to enlisting volunteer armed school security 
officers from the ranks of former law enforcement, military, public safety organizations, 
and the “extraordinary corps of patriotic, trained[,] qualified citizens.”64 Rostron notes that 
South Dakota passed legislation in 2013 permitting, but not requiring, school boards to 
authorize armed “sentinels” and to arm school employees in conjunction with citizen and 
law enforcement involvement.65 Rostron concludes that while Sandy Hook created many 
legislative initiatives within states, only a few laws were passed, most of which have been 
tied up by insurance issues and local concerns.66 These were missed opportunities, claims 
Rostron: “If a few states really put guns in all or most classrooms, this country would at 
least get an opportunity to see what effects it would have.”67 
Researchers Levine and Mcknight have studied some of the unintended 
consequences of the Sandy Hook shooting. They believe that the effects of Sandy Hook 
led to the purchase of an additional three million guns, above and beyond those that would  
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ordinarily be sold, by Americans in the five months following the shootings at Sandy 
Hook.68 They also contend that—based on the statistics from California—first-time gun 
buyers purchased the majority of these firearms.69 Their statistical research concludes that 
an additional 59 accidental deaths, including those of 20 children, could be attributed to 
this influx of additional firearms, which may be in keeping with accidents made by first-
time gun purchasers.70 Because Levine and McKnight base their research on FBI 
background checks conducted by licensed firearms dealers, it seems likely that the actual 
numbers of firearms sold are much higher than the five million cited by the authors given 
the number of private, unreported sales. A second limitation of Levine and Mcknight’s 
work is that it considers only accidental deaths and excludes homicides or injuries caused 
by firearms.  
The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and Sandy Hook seem to serve as cases 
in point that reinforce Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski’s “belief in a dangerous world” 
within the American psyche.71 For instance, according to Crusto, following the landfall of 
Hurricane Katrina, some 200 New Orleans Police Department officers abandoned their 
jobs, creating a shortage of personnel to respond to the disaster.72 Additionally, says 
Giannell, some of the officers who remained were accused of criminal actions such as 
looting, murder, and planting evidence on their victims.73 Furthermore, Belser states that 
even the Louisiana National Guard had difficulty controlling the activity of gang members 
at the emergency housing facility at the Superdome.74 Finally, Crusto recounts how the 
mayor of New Orleans and his chief of police ordered the confiscation of firearms from  
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those remaining in the decimated city.75 Ultimately, says Belser, even some of those trying 
to flee New Orleans to the suburbs were turned away by armed agents of local 
government.76 
Unlike the discussions following the Sandy Hook shooting, the narrative that 
followed Hurricane Katrina focused more on defending the rights of gun owners. As an 
example, Louisiana H.B. 760, passed in 2006, prevents the confiscation of firearms during 
an emergency while giving the chief law enforcement officer five days to regulate firearm 
storage, possession, display, sale, and transportation.77 Likewise, Congress proposed the 
Disaster Recovery Personal Protection Act that same year, which would have placed 
further restrictions on the confiscation of firearms during a declared disaster; it was adopted 
as the Vitter Amendment to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act in 
2007.78 
When Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski’s “belief in a dangerous world” is 
conceptualized alongside the ideas of “frontier masculinity” and the “do-it-yourself” 
attitudes described by Melzer and Burbick, the NRA’s good-guy-with-a-gun stance and 
calls for arming school staff make sense—at least to some.79 The dramatic rise in firearm 
sales, massive increases in the number of concealed weapon permits, and calls for the 
relaxing of gun regulations all become logical outcomes of this train of thought.  
If the prevailing solution to gun violence continues to be to inject more guns—and 
armed citizens—into society, then public safety organizations should take this changing 
landscape into account in the development of strategic, operational, and tactical policies  
 
 
75 Crusto, “State of Emergency,” 491–94. 
76 Belser, “Martial Law after the Storm,” 165. 
77 Jeffrey D. Sadow, “Legislative Regular Session through Jun. 24,” Louisiana Legislature Log (blog), 
June 24, 2006, http://laleglog.blogspot.com/2006/06/legislative-regular-session-through_24.html. 
78 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109–295, 120 Stat. 1391 (2006), 
https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ295/PLAW-109publ295.pdf. 
79 Rostron, “School Shootings and the Legislative Push,” 442–43. 
18 
and training. Understanding how these evolving conditions will affect the operating 
environment in which law enforcement and emergency services work is key to developing 
new policies and training. Convergence theory is one tool that can be used for this purpose. 
C. DISASTER CONVERGENCE 
Convergence is a well-documented disaster phenomenon that has yet to be fully 
applied to the planning and response process for crisis events and the increase in armed 
citizens.80 When a disaster unfolds over several hours or days, the influx of people and 
equipment to the disaster area can be challenging for public safety officers and impair their 
ability to stabilize the event. However, the arrival and presence of armed citizens may 
further complicate public safety officers’ jobs in an already challenging environment.  
First discerned by Fritz and Mathewson in 1957, convergence is the principle that 
people, equipment, and information will move toward the disaster site following a 
disaster.81 This movement, according to Fritz and Mathewson, comes from either outside 
of the disaster perimeter (external convergence) or areas within the immediate area of the 
disaster site (internal convergence).82 Figure 1 depicts Fritz and Mathewson’s visual 
representation of convergence behavior during disasters. 
 
80 Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, Convergence Behaviors in Disasters: A Problem in Social 
Control, Disaster Study No. 9 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council, 1957), https://archive.org/details/convergencebehav00fritrich. 
81 Fritz and Mathewson, 1. 
82 Fritz and Mathewson, 3. 
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Figure 1. A Spatial Model of Convergence Behavior83 
Fritz and Mathewson assign contiguous, proximate, and remote zones to areas 
external to the disaster. The contiguous zone is the unaffected area immediately 
surrounding the disaster area.84 The proximate zone consists of communities outside the 
affected disaster area.85 The remote zone, according to Fritz and Mathewson, may vary in 
size and distance but is far enough away that news of the disaster may not immediately 
reach people in it.86 Survivors of the disaster are most likely to flee to the contiguous or 
proximate zones while the majority of convergers will likely come from these same 
locations. Kendrick and Wachtendorf express limited faith in the ability of Fritz and 
 
83 Source: Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behaviors in Disasters, 6–7. 
84 Fritz and Mathewson, 5. 
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86 Fritz and Mathewson, 5. 
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Mathewson’s use of concentric circles to adequately represent patterns of convergence.87 
Instead, they believe that convergence should be studied based on the legitimacy of the 
motivations causing people to move toward a disaster.88 For example, law enforcement and 
EMS workers have legitimate reasons for moving toward the scene of an active shooter. 
The media’s convergence on the same scene has somewhat less legitimacy. Meanwhile, 
“gawkers” and curious members of the community claim the least legitimacy in this 
scenario. 
Fritz and Mathewson identify several different motivations for the convergence of 
people at a disaster scene. Each type of converger can be defined by its needs and 
motivations, which vary.89 Furthermore, claim Kendra and Wachtendorf, the types of 
convergers demonstrate varying levels of legitimacy in their claims to be present during 
crisis events.90 In this manner, says Kendra and Wachtendorf, convergence becomes “a 
physical manifestation of the social construction of the disaster: simultaneously reflecting 
and helping to constitute it.”91 
First, claim Fritz and Mathewson, are the “returnees”—those who were evacuated 
or departed under their own power from the disaster site.92 Included in the returnees are 
“substitutes” such as friends and family who have gone to the disaster site to assist their 
relatives or loved ones.93 This same demographic may choose to converge on a disaster out 
of anxiety for missing loved ones and is classified as “the anxious” by Fritz and 
Mathewson.94 A third demographic identified by Fritz and Mathewson is termed the 
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“helpers.”95 They deliver informal and uncoordinated volunteer assistance to disaster 
victims.96 A fourth category consists of those individuals who converge on a disaster scene 
out of curiosity, typified by those without direct ties to the area involved and without 
specific intent to assist the victims.97 The final category, say Fritz and Mathewson, 
comprises “the exploiters.”98 Examples of exploiters are looters, souvenir hunters, those 
wishing to cash in on relief provisions, and people looking to profit from the disaster.99 
During an intentional act of violence, such as an active shooter incident, individuals in this 
category may slow the authorities’ ability to distinguish among the victims, perpetrators, 
and the curious, which may further delay an organized response. 
Kendra and Wachtendorf emphasize that convergers’ classifications are dynamic 
and may change as their motivations and needs change over the course of the crisis event.100 
Not only may convergers’ typologies change, but the convergers are also likely to display 
varying degrees of legitimacy. Finally, the findings of Hughes et al. demonstrate that each 
type of physical converger identified by Fritz and Mathewson and Kendra and 
Wachtendorf has a counterpart in cyberspace following disasters.101 These online 
convergers and the velocity at which information travels over the internet may further 
complicate legitimate response efforts by distracting from real issues. For instance, Rostron 
states, “Perhaps the most appalling aspect of the New Orleans gun seizure saga is that it 
managed to distract attention from the enormously greater injustices and tragedies that 
occurred in the wake of the hurricane.”102 In future situations like this, online exploiters 
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may rapidly converge on disasters and manipulate these tragedies for their benefit or, 
conversely, serve as watchdogs for official misconduct. 
More recent examinations of the convergence phenomenon suggest additional 
categories of human convergers.103 Kendra and Wachtendorf identified a new type of 
converger during their study of convergence at the World Trade Center following 9/11 that 
they termed “the supporter.”104 Supporters came to show their moral support for emergency 
workers and were characterized by such actions as the placement of banners and thank-you 
notes.105 This motivation is likely responsible for the convergence of hundreds of armed 
citizens at Cliven Bundy’s Nevada ranch in 2014, which prevented agents of the federal 
government from rounding up Bundy’s illegally grazing cattle.106 
Regardless of the reason for the convergence, this ingress of people to the scene of 
a disaster causes many problems. Fritz and Mathewson document instances when road 
congestion delayed firefighting apparatuses from arriving on the scene, hampering fire 
suppression efforts.107 Related traffic issues have been documented, such as the delay of 
ambulances en route to hospitals with injured patients or the blocking of hospitals 
altogether.108 Kendra and Wachtendorf’s experiences at ground zero following 9/11 
confirm that managing the needs of the returnees as well as those of other convergers 
occupied much of the authorities’ time and resources.109 
Information convergence is the second factor studied by Fritz and Mathewson.110 
The two-way nature of communications complicates the problems associated with 
information convergence. According to the authors, incoming information and 
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communications are the dominant types immediately after a disaster.111 Outgoing 
information in response to the initial influx can further disrupt communication networks, 
resulting in delays and the further spread of misinformation.112 Fritz and Mathewson 
conclude that delays in information dissemination lead to the spread of erroneous, 
ambiguous, and sensational stories.113 This same delay in information transmission may 
also encourage armed citizens to move toward the disaster site. Finally, Fritz and 
Mathewson state, “The falsity of disaster information is perhaps a less frequent stimulator 
of convergence than the ambiguity of information.”114 Therefore, providing information to 
the public as it becomes available is a better strategy for reducing convergence behavior 
than providing no information whatsoever. 
Although Fritz and Mathewson offer a compelling framework by which to analyze 
20th-century convergence dilemmas, scholars such as Hughes et al. bring these dilemmas 
into the 21st century, assessing technology’s role in crisis response. For example, Hughes 
et al. have studied the effects of the internet and social media on convergence. They found 
that within 90 minutes of the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007, a Facebook page had been 
established as a means for students to notify everyone that they were safe and assist in the 
compilation of names of the dead and injured.115 The authors also show how such online 
activities can lead to negative impacts, noting that this same Facebook page was co-opted 
by the media to contact witnesses of the shooting, which left some of the participants 
feeling exploited and manipulated.116  
According to Fritz and Mathewson, the most significant complication that arises 
from the historical analysis of convergence is the failure to anticipate it and the 
consequences it brings.117 For example, law enforcement may erect effective barriers on 
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the border of the contiguous zone and the disaster area to prevent external convergers from 
entering the disaster zone, only to have hospitals “swamped” by unanticipated internal 
convergers moving inside the disaster zone.118 A second problem identified by Fritz and 
Mathewson is that most policies aimed at minimizing the effects of convergence are 
initiated after it has begun rather than beforehand.119 
What is absent from the literature on convergence is any study of the convergence 
of armed volunteers at a scene of a mass shooting who have the intent to stop the killing. 
These convergers would likely be classified as helpers by Fritz and Mathewson. Under 
current and proposed school programs, armed responders with varying degrees of 
legitimacy might converge from both internal and external locations. For instance, internal 
helpers might consist of sworn SROs and armed guards, or if school districts choose to arm 
administrators, teachers, and other support staff, these non-sworn personnel may opt to 
converge on an active shooter scene.  
After receiving a social media notification of a school shooting, it is also 
conceivable that parents, concerned citizens, and others with firearms and CCW permits 
would form groups of external convergers. The FBI, in its September 2017 Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, explicitly describes the potential for “armed citizen responders” in 
rural communities.120 Buerger and Buerger observe that rural residents may serve on 
volunteer ambulance services or fire departments and, therefore, receive advance 
notification of crisis events.121 Additionally, rural areas are often associated with an 
elevated rate of firearm ownership.122 Because rural areas may experience prolonged 
response times from law enforcement, the opportunity for an armed citizen response to 
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school incidents might increase the chances of friendly fire accidents and “collateral 
injuries.”123 
D. CONCLUSION 
The literature shows that a perfect storm is forming in mounting gun sales, 
increasing numbers of armed citizens, and loosening rules of engagement. When the 
concept of disaster convergence is factored in, this perfect storm is changing the landscape 
that all public safety agencies are operating within. Public safety agency leadership, 
community leaders, and politicians should consider new ways of engaging the public in 
general, and gun owners specifically, by making adjustments to their strategic, operational, 
and tactical plans. 
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III. CRISIS EVENT OUTCOMES: ARMED TEACHERS, GUN 
CARRYING, AND DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT 
One evolutionary response to recent mass shootings in schools is the arming of 
civilian school staff members. For members of law enforcement and emergency service 
organizations working in communities that encourage or allow this practice, the tactical 
situation during a response to school property becomes more complicated. While law 
enforcement officers know there is always at least one firearm present at every call—their 
own—the presence of additional firearms is always a concern. These matters become more 
complex in the setting of a school, where it may be impossible to determine who is carrying 
a firearm and with what legitimacy and level of training. The combination of these factors 
with the general chaos that typically accompanies mass casualty incidents, and the sensitive 
nature of schools, renders the presence of firearms in private hands a recipe for disaster. 
A. ARMED SCHOOL STAFF POLICIES 
According to Rostron, the formal practice of arming teachers dates back to at least 
2007 when the Harold (Texas) Independent School District began allowing employees with 
CCW permits to bring guns to work.124 Rostron explains that it is difficult to accurately 
assess the prevalence of armed school employees because, before Sandy Hook, many state 
laws did not address the issue or prohibit the practice, thereby allowing the practice with 
little scrutiny.125 
Numerous authors attribute the broader spread of the idea of arming school staff to 
the post–Sandy Hook school shooting environment. According to Kupchik, Brent, and 
Mowen, the opening salvo in the battle over arming school staff may have been launched 
by the powerful NRA.126 In a news conference held one week after the Sandy Hook 
shooting, Wayne LaPierre, executive vice president of the NRA, stated, “The only thing 
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that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.”127 The NRA’s good-guy-with-
a-gun stance is hardly surprising given the well-documented increase in media reporting 
on the gun debate. According to Laschever, the number of stories on “gun violence” in the 
New York Times increased by 450 percent in the 12 months following the Sandy Hook 
shooting.128 Laschever documents similar increases in the media’s reporting on the topics 
of “gun control” and “gun rights.”129 Additionally, according to Laschever, funding for gun 
control organizations more than tripled between 2012 and 2013.130 Schildkraut and 
Muschert’s research supports Laschever’s findings, observing that “the media have the 
ability to define and shape issues and events, as opposed to reflecting what is occurring in 
society at a particular time.”131 They note that in the 30 days following the 1999 Columbine 
school shooting, there were approximately 170 news stories and editorials; after Sandy 
Hook, there were 132 similar articles.132 However, according to Schildkraut and Muschert, 
following Sandy Hook, the articles were more constant and focused more heavily on gun 
control efforts and the nature of America’s gun culture than the reporting following 
Columbine, which centered on the victims of the school shooting.133 
1. Debate 
Before proceeding with an analysis of the ongoing debate over the arming of school 
employees, there is an important distinction that needs to be made regarding the language 
of the debate. Semantics are important, as the words that people use when participating in 
a debate—or any public discourse—communicate their preferences and prejudices and 
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actively signal to different audiences. Authors such as DeMitchell, Rajan and Baras, and 
Rogers et al., who are critics of arming civilians inside schools, predominantly refer to 
challenges in arming “teachers.”134 However, authors more open to such policies use 
phrases such as “strategic citizens,” “school employees,” and “armed educators.”135 
According to Jones, this language suggests that the two sides of the guns-in-schools debate 
promote outcomes and create arguments based on their intrinsic values and motivated 
reasoning.136 Jones believes that the argument over armed teachers is drawn along 
predictable lines: a no-guns contingent and a more-guns contingent, which she refers to as 
“BanGuns” and “MoreGuns” strategies.137 Jones further identifies a third category for 
arming schools, “SomeGuns,” which this thesis does not address because its philosophy of 
armed police officers or private security officers represents the strategy currently employed 
by many schools in the United States.138  
The more-guns contingency, spearheaded by the NRA’s Wayne La Pierre, declared 
that America has an “extraordinary corps of patriotic, trained[,] qualified citizens” ready 
to help secure American schools.139 The more-guns contingent, claims Jones, flourishes in 
cultures where there is support for guns on campus from parent and teacher organizations 
and acceptance of the risks involved by those carrying guns on school grounds.140 
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Moreover, the laws must be permissive of armed school staff, and the school district must 
be willing to accept the risk.141 Finally, a robust training program for armed school staff 
must be in place.142 Arguments supporting a more-guns philosophy center on the ideas that 
armed school staff members may serve as a deterrent to an active shooter, can respond 
more quickly than law enforcement, and may be the only financially viable option for many 
school districts.143 
Meanwhile, Ken Trump with National School Safety and Security Services 
summarizes the view of opponents of arming school staff. According to Trump, “‘The vast 
majority of teachers want to be armed with textbooks and computers . . . not guns.’”144 
Jones views this no-guns ideology as being dominant in communities that are unwilling to 
incur any liability or accept the risk of arming school staff, cultures that do not support 
firearms in schools, and districts that cannot secure insurance or administer an efficient 
armed-employee program.145 Critics of armed school staff policies point toward myriad 
problems with such proposals. In addition to the expense associated with equipping and 
properly training teachers to carry firearms, Rajan and Branas question the feasibility of 
combining the responsibilities of diverse professions such as educator and law enforcement 
officer.146 They also question the psychological effects on student learning and the school 
environment.147 Finally, concerns over negligent discharges of educators’ weapons, 
accidental student injury, and the potential for irrational or impulsive misuse of a firearm 
by a school staff member round out the arguments against arming teachers.148 
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Despite these two well-entrenched camps, Winston claims there is no consensus on 
whether arming teachers is a sound policy.149 One major obstacle to good policy decision 
making is the lack of sound research on the issue. Critics of arming educators, such as 
Rogers et al., contend that the Dickey Amendment—a provision in federal spending bills 
that prohibits the use of tax dollars by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to 
study gun violence—is one of the major roadblocks to obtaining data on the issue of arming 
school staff.150 Other factors preventing good research on the issue of guns in schools 
include the patchwork of state laws about arming school staff, the few school districts that 
have implemented armed-staff policies, and the general safety of America’s public 
schools.151 
The pro–armed staff position argues that schools have a duty and responsibility to 
protect students while they are on school grounds. Authors Jones and DeMitchell seem to 
believe that the in loco parentis (in place of the parent) role of schools establishes a duty 
on the part of the school district to protect children from predictable dangers.152 However, 
Weatherby hotly contests the notion that arming school staff is the proper outcome of this 
philosophy. She argues that with few exceptions, there is no legal obligation on the part of 
a school district to protect students from active shooters or other types of violence.153 
Weatherby goes on to cite two exceptions to this immunity: first, in cases where injuries 
are sustained as a result of “government-created danger” and, second, when a municipality 
forfeits its immunity by failing to properly train its employees after implementing a policy 
that results in a government-created danger.154  
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Weatherby convincingly argues that arming school staff members might result in a 
government-created danger. For example, she notes that despite regular training, law 
enforcement officers miss their targets between 52 and 82 percent of the time.155 
Weatherby contends that even the use of law enforcement statistics as a surrogate for 
teacher’s shooting scores would likely invoke the policy of government-created danger in 
the event of a firearm-related negligent discharge or injured student during a potential gun 
battle.156 Weatherby goes on to question how school districts could ensure the proper levels 
of training for armed school staff, especially given the inconsistent requirements under 
different states’ laws.157 
2. Adoption 
Jones says that since 2007, more than 20 states have seen legislation introduced that 
permits school employees to carry firearms.158 The Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence observes that there are currently eight states that allow citizens possessing CCW 
permits to carry guns on K-12 school grounds.159 Giffords Law Center further notes that 
12 states cannot prohibit the concealed carry of firearms on college campuses.160 Because 
individual states regulate how teachers may carry guns on school grounds, there is no 
consistency in the enactment of armed school staff policies.  
For example, the states of Utah and Kansas require armed school staff to possess a 
state-issued CCW permit.161 In Utah, school staff are not required to notify the school 
administration if they are carrying firearms.162 In contrast, states such as South Dakota and 
Texas have well-defined programs that dictate a minimum of 80 hours of firearm training, 
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renewal periods, background checks, and psychological examinations.163 Regardless, in 
each of these states, the decision about whether to arm school staff is left primarily to 
individual school districts, which further complicates the research of the armed-teacher 
paradigm. In other words, even in states with permissive regulations, there is no mandate 
to arm school staff but merely the ability to choose to do so.  
As Rostron discusses, the legal ability to arm school staff and the decision of 
individual districts to do so are only two of the complications in actually implementing 
armed school staff. The third challenge for implementing armed school staff is related to 
Weatherby’s observations on the nature of risk and liability, as previously described. In 
Kansas, a state with one of the laxest regulations governing armed school staff, school 
districts wishing to implement armed teachers have been challenged by their insurance 
carriers.164 Three Kansas insurance companies, including the state’s largest insurer of 
public schools, have refused to indemnify districts that implement armed school staff, 
citing unacceptable shifts of risk.165 Jones notes the irony of the armed-teacher paradigm, 
stating that despite the “abundance of gun legislation proposing to lessen gun 
restrictions . . . the recipients of the legislation are overwhelming[ly] opposed to adding 
more guns.”166  
Although the NoGuns and the Some/MoreGuns contingents disagree on many 
things, one area of agreement, albeit from different perspectives, is the need (or difficulty) 
in obtaining proper training for armed school staff members. Weatherby argues that even 
highly trained police officers may experience a shooting error 52–82 percent of the time. 
Meanwhile, Jones lists training requirements as one of the most critical factors for a school 
district to address when considering an armed teacher program while noting that even in 
California, an unpaid school reserve officer needs as little as 40 hours of training.167 
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Unfortunately, the state-by-state nature of the armed school staff paradigm prevents 
even a consensus on what the proper amount of training is, what this training should consist 
of, and who should perform the training of armed school staff members. Rostron’s state-
by-state study documents many of these differences.168 On the high side, South Dakota 
requires 80 hours of training for its “school sentinels” to be overseen by the state’s 
commission on peace officer standards and training.169 Meanwhile, Tennessee’s legislators 
enacted legislation allowing only current and former law enforcement officers to carry guns 
on school property and only after completing another 40 hours of training.170  
On the other end of the spectrum, Kansas state law allows school staff members in 
possession of a valid Kansas CCW permit to carry guns on school grounds.171 This permit 
may be obtained by any Kansas citizen legally allowed to have a firearm, who has 
completed an eight-hour handgun safety and training class conducted by a private 
organization such as the NRA.172 Weatherby singles out the state of Utah as one of the only 
places where anyone with a CCW permit may carry weapons on public school grounds.173 
None of the states in Rostron’s survey mandate the simulated live-fire training that 
Weatherby identifies as being a critical component of preparing armed school staff 
members to respond to an active shooter.174 The lack of such in-depth training, claims 
Weatherby, may open school districts to liability in the event their negligence leads to the 
injury or death of a student.175 
Ironically, both the NoGuns and the Some/MoreGuns contingent agree on one 
thing; there is not enough research on the subject of guns to make educated assessments of 
what “right and wrong” in this arena look like. Members of the NoGun contingent, such as 
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Rodgers et al., blame the Dickey Amendment and its ban on the CDC’s use of federal 
injury prevention and control funds for the current lack of evidence-based research on 
effective measures against gun violence prevention.176 Conversely, Rostron notes, “If a 
few states really put guns in all or most classrooms, this country would at least get an 
opportunity to see what effects it would have.”177 What seems clear at this point is that in 
the absence of hard data, those on either side of the debate will continue to politicize the 
effects of arming school staff members by envisioning worst-case scenarios involving what 
DeMitchell characterizes as the “safest place in [many students’] lives.”178 
In summary, the debate over arming teachers is likely to continue. For law 
enforcement and emergency services personnel who work in areas where schools permit 
armed educators to carry firearms, an added level of social and political complexity will be 
present. It is crucial for law enforcement and emergency service agencies to keep sight of 
public and private school policies on armed-teachers in advance of an incident at a school 
in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies are likely already in 
possession of the necessary equipment, facilities, and trained instructors to assist school 
districts wishing to pursue an armed staff member program. It is equally important that law 
enforcement and emergency services participate in ongoing discussions with parents and 
school district officials on this subject.  
B. DISASTER CONVERGENCE DURING ACTIVE SHOOTER SCENARIOS  
The convergence phenomenon, as described by Fritz and Mathewson, may further 
complicate an efficient response to an active shooter incident. Entities preplanning a 
response to a violent incident must account for this principle. Convergers in this type of 
setting may come from either internal or external locations. In a school shooting, internal 
convergers, or those moving toward specific points from within the disaster area’s 
boundary, will likely consist of sworn SROs, teachers, or administrators.179 However, 
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depending on the nature and location of the event, it is reasonable to anticipate the presence 
of student convergers as well. In a school with armed staff present, policies may dictate 
whether armed staff move toward the sound of gunfire, as law enforcement is expected to 
do, or assume a defensive position from where they can protect the student body. 
External convergers or those moving into the disaster site from outside areas may 
come from the different zones identified by Fritz and Mathewson.180 SROs patrolling 
outside the building when shooting commences would likely represent the closest 
assistance from the immediate area, or the contiguous zone, although armed school staff 
may move in from the contiguous zone either by policy or out of moral obligation. Law 
enforcement resources may, depending on their location, begin arriving from either 
proximate or remote zones.181 The fire department and EMS assets will likely stage a safe 
distance away from the disaster, possibly on the border between the contiguous and 
proximate zones.182 
If these circumstances are examined entirely, the possibility of armed citizen 
convergers must also be considered, even in suburban settings. While the number of 
households with guns in them is in decline, guns sales and the number of CCW permits 
have grown dramatically since Sandy Hook, suggesting that more people are carrying more 
guns than ever before.183 Burbic and Melzer have identified the American gun-owner’s 
characteristics of frontier masculinity and bias for action.184 Deputy Scot Peterson’s failure 
to enter Marjory Stoneman High School and engage Nicholas Cruz was broadly 
documented and widely criticized as a failure of law enforcement to protect school 
children.185 Whether fueled by specific instances of governmental failure or by Stroebe, 
Leander, and Kruglanski’s “belief in a dangerous world,” the combination of these factors 
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may provide the means, motive, and opportunity for citizen gun owners to take matters into 
their own hands. Distrust or suspicion of the government, founded or not, may fuel the 
citizens’ belief in a dangerous world. 
C. HURRICANE KATRINA: BACKGROUND AND OUTCOMES 
One of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina is that politicians, emergency 
managers, and emergency responders must consider the presence of firearms and an armed 
citizenry in their disaster response preplanning and operations. During the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, reports of rampant looting and violence caused officials to deviate from 
their stated mission of saving lives, instead focusing their efforts and resources on arresting 
looters.186 While many of these stories were ultimately proven to be “little more than 
figments of frightened imaginations” at the time, they were taken seriously enough to 
allegedly lead New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) officials to order officers to shoot 
looters on sight.187 Moreover, the government’s suspension of rescue efforts combined 
with orders to shoot citizens undoubtedly left many agreeing with firearm trainer John 
Farnum’s sentiments: “The promise that government, at any level, will provide people with 
meaningful protection is now seen as a hollow myth.”188 
1. Distrust and Suspicion of the Government 
Distrust in the government and suspicion of law enforcement is hardly something 
new. However, man-made and natural disasters can bring the issues associated with such 
distrust to the forefront of public officials’ problems at the worst possible time. Crisis 
events will likely tax emergency response agencies beyond their capabilities and hamper 
their ability to respond efficiently. Hurricane Katrina provides a strong case in point. 
According to Cordasco et al., the distrust of authorities among residents of New Orleans 
was one of the factors that caused 100,000 residents to ignore clear instructions from the 
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government to evacuate before the arrival of Hurricane Katrina.189 By failing to follow 
these instructions, those remaining in and around New Orleans “put their own lives and the 
lives of first responders in danger.”190 
Both Miller and Rivera and Cordasco et al. identify the people’s trust in government 
(or lack thereof) as a major determinant in the success of disaster operations.191 Cordasco 
et al. state that competency was the most frequently cited area of distrust in the government 
by the victims of Katrina that they interviewed.192 Miller and Rivera add the lack of 
equality, the absence of transparency, and the failure of inclusivity as further causes of 
distrust in government.193 Furthermore, they say, “The lack of coordination and federal 
bureaucracy served to decrease civic trust in local, state, and federal government” during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina.194 These cautionary tales from Katrina provide current 
public officials and public safety agencies a roadmap for creating a sense of trust with the 
people they serve.  
It remains undeniable that a week after the levees failed in New Orleans, NOPD 
police superintendent Eddie Compass declared, “Guns will be taken. Only law enforcement 
are allowed to have weapons.”195 The results of his comments and policy of gun 
confiscation have fueled a great and lasting debate. According to the NRA, citizens used 
firearms extensively to defend their property from roving marauders at a time when 
hundreds of NOPD officers deserted their jobs.196 Evidence suggests that not only did these 
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NOPD officers abandon their jobs just when they were most needed, but at least some of 
them began engaging in criminal activity themselves.197 The NRA then claimed that as the 
waters began to recede, subject to the orders of Mayor Nagin and NOPD Superintendent 
Compass, law enforcement began going door-to-door confiscating firearms from civilians, 
assaulting them, and imprisoning them for doing nothing more than defending their 
property.198 Finally, the NRA and other pro-gun organizations filed suit against the city of 
New Orleans, initiating a years-long process to compel the city to return over 500 
confiscated firearms.199 
Others who have traced the story of the weapons confiscation believe that the NRA 
and other pro-gun groups are distorting the facts of the case. One reserve police officer 
who was present during the disaster response in New Orleans claims there were no 
widespread confiscation efforts by police.200 Instead, observes Rostron, many of the 
firearms obtained by the NOPD were collected from those trying to evacuate on public 
transit or staying in government-provided housing or from properties abandoned by their 
owners as they fled the hurricane.201 Both Rostron and Weinstein heavily criticize the NRA 
for using the story of gun confiscation during Katrina to direct attention away from the real 
victims of the disaster—the residents of New Orleans—and toward what Weinstein calls a 
“terrible one-off, a cautionary tale that led to reforms on every level.”202 
Unfortunately, it appears that officials have not learned their lesson about poor 
community messaging on firearms and disaster response. The following year, New 
Orleans’ new superintendent of police, Warren Riley, declared during a radio interview 
that he would again order his officers to confiscate guns during a future disaster or crisis 
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event.203 This statement further fueled gun-rights activists’ claims that the government 
would take away not only citizens’ guns but their rights as well.204 While Riley later 
retracted his statement, it would be repeated years later by another government official 
faced with an imminent natural disaster.205 
In September 2017, with Hurricane Irma and Marie bearing down on the Caribbean, 
Kenneth Mapp, the governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), issued an order authorizing 
the adjutant general of the USVI National Guard to “seize arms, ammunition, explosives, 
and incendiary material and other property required.”206 While Governor Mapp has 
repeatedly stated this order did not empower the National Guard to seize civilian-owned 
firearms, the fact-checking website Snopes concluded that the language of the order 
indicates “it can reasonably be assumed that such confiscation would extend to the property 
of civilians, especially since there is nothing in the order to contradict this natural 
assumption, or to stipulate that only property owned by incorporated entities or trusts may 
be seized.”207 At this time, there is no indication that any firearms were confiscated from 
civilians during these events.208 However, Governor Mapp has continued to renew this 
executive order, even in the absence of an imminent natural disaster; moreover, he has 
never changed the language of the order despite being questioned on its intent by members 
of the U.S. House of Representatives.209  
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The real intent of Governor Mapp, NOPD Superintendent Riley, NOPD 
Superintendent Compass, and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin regarding the confiscation 
of civilian-owned firearms in the face of natural disasters may never be known. What is 
known is that these comments have given gun-rights organizations, such as the NRA and 
the Second Amendment Foundation, pulpits from which to spread distrust over the 
government’s willingness to confiscate civilian-owned weapons in times of emergency. 
These public-messaging examples by officials facing natural disasters show how well-
intentioned policies backfire and create increased public distrust at the most inopportune 
times. Nagin, Compass, and Riley are long gone from their positions, but NRA Vice 
President Wayne LaPierre’s cry, “Remember New Orleans,” lives on.210 In this case, the 
perception remains stronger than reality. It would do other politicians and emergency 
managers well to remember this point. 
2. Impact of an Armed Citizenry: The Right to Carry 
The impacts of the failures during the response to Hurricane Katrina did not end 
with the NRA’s successful lawsuit to have confiscated firearms returned to their owners.211 
Nor did it end with the enactment of federal legislation that prohibited the seizing of 
citizens’ firearms during disaster relief operations.212 Instead, pro-gun organizations used 
(and continue to use) these failures, and the distrust that they embody, to advocate for the 
strengthening of citizens’ gun rights.213 Two pro-gun initiatives spurred on by the failures 
of Hurricane Katrina include right-to-carry legislation and stand-your-ground laws. The 
promulgation of these laws across more and more states will likely have a lasting impact 
on how law enforcement and emergency services personnel do their jobs. 
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a. Legislation 
So-called “right-to-carry” or “shall-issue” concealed-carry laws dictate that a state 
or county must issue a firearm CCW license to anyone who applies that is legally eligible 
to receive one.214 Shall-issue states are in sharp contrast to “may-issue” states, which 
reserve the right to determine who may obtain a CCW permit.215 The number of CCW 
permit holders nationwide has continued to climb in recent years, skyrocketing to over 
17.25 million in the wake of crisis events and the passage of less restrictive gun control 
measures such as right-to-carry laws.216 
Following Hurricane Katrina, the residents of New Orleans maintained a healthy 
distrust of the government’s ability to protect them, believing that “the only real security 
in New Orleans [was] private, not public.”217 In the year following Hurricane Katrina, the 
number of CCW permits in New Orleans doubled, and gun sales increased dramatically.218 
However, according to Rostron, in the first quarter of 2007, murders had also increased by 
182 percent and armed robberies by 135 percent.219 
b. Debate 
The debate over right-to-carry laws remains contentious on both sides. Some 
authors believe that lax concealed-carry laws would lead to an epidemic of violence and a 
return to the “wild west.”220 Meanwhile, other authors contend that “armed citizens and 
police officers are natural allies and teammates in the fight against crime.”221  
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There is widespread disagreement over the long-term results of expanded 
concealed-carry laws as well. According to Spitzer, research conducted by John Lott 
concludes that “a 1% increase in gun ownership causes a 3% decrease in murder as well as 
declines in rapes, robberies and aggravated assaults.”222 However, Spitzer notes that there 
is significant dissent over Lott’s methodology and questions about his ethics.223 A 2007 
study by LaValle claims that right-to-carry legislation has no observable effect on either 
homicide or gun homicide statistics.224 From this perspective, right-to-carry laws do not 
make communities safer, but they have not led to the wild-west shootouts predicted by 
critics. Spitzer concludes that these mixed results “emphasize the considerable difficulty 
in isolating the effect of a single law among states [that are] very different from each 
other.”225 
c. Adoption 
The most apparent impact of right-to-carry legislation for law enforcement and 
emergency service personnel is increased encounters with armed citizens. Right-to-carry 
laws have been enacted in over 40 states.226 One predictable but unfortunate effect of the 
growth in the number of CCW licensees is the challenge faced by law enforcement in 
distinguishing the good guy with a gun from the bad guy with a gun. Law enforcement 
writer Mike Wood emphasizes the need for law enforcement officers to slow down their 
decision making on “man with a gun” calls in response to several high-profile media stories 
about law enforcement killing or injuring armed citizens with guns.227 While Wood states 
that “the presence of a gun does not always indicate a threat,” it certainly complicates the 
ability of law enforcement and emergency services personnel to make safe split-second 
decisions.228 
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Furthermore, the relaxation of concealed-carry laws has led to the enactment of 
even more permissive laws that will likely have unintended consequences for citizens and 
emergency service workers. In 2013, the state of Louisiana passed a first-of-its-kind 
statewide amendment further strengthening individuals’ gun rights, and further limiting the 
state’s ability to regulate firearm possession.229 This amendment not only enshrines 
individual gun ownership as a “fundamental right” but also requires the courts to use “strict 
scrutiny,” the highest level of judicial scrutiny, on any new gun laws.230 The unintended 
consequences of this amendment were immediately realized in the courts when convicted 
felons began challenging prohibitions on their possession of firearms or limitations on their 
carrying of firearms as infringements of their constitutional rights.231  
Additionally, this amendment placed restrictions on the legislature regarding laws 
that would limit where CCW holders could legally carry firearms.232 According to USA 
Today, at least seven other states have introduced such legislation.233 Laws such as this, 
while well-intentioned, make it harder to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and only 
in the hands of those legally entitled to possess them. 
3. Impact of an Armed Citizenry: Stand-Your-Ground Laws and the 
Castle Doctrine 
Other gun-related policies that have evolved from natural disasters such as 
Hurricane Katrina are the so-called castle doctrine and stand-your-ground laws.234 The 
castle doctrine stems from English common law, which extended the privilege of the use 
of deadly force to an individual protecting oneself from a potentially deadly threat.235 
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However, enshrined in this privilege is the “duty to retreat,” meaning that before the use of 
deadly force becomes justifiable, the defendant must make every attempt to escape an 
aggressor.236 The sole exception in English common law to the duty to retreat is an attack 
inside one’s home or “castle.”237 This “defense of habitation” gave rise to the castle 
doctrine in the United States, where as early as 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
that “a man attacked in his own home had no duty to retreat before using deadly force, so 
long as he reasonably believed it necessary to save his own life.”238 
a. Legislation 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2004, Florida lawmakers expanded their castle 
doctrine laws to include the right to use deadly force—without a duty to retreat—to areas 
outside a person’s home including one’s vehicles or any other place an individual has a 
right to be.239 Furthermore, Catalfamo explains that Florida’s new law includes a 
presumption of innocence as well as immunity from criminal or civil prosecution for an 
individual using lethal force as permitted.240 She further argues that these expanded rights 
are a significant deviation from English common law practices and the original castle 
doctrine.241 
b. Debate 
Proponents of stand-your-ground laws, such as the NRA’s Marion Hammer, state 
that “nobody has the right to decide what’s in your mind and heart when you’re under 
attack. So the important thing is to make it more dangerous for the attacker than for the 
victim.”242 This argument reinforces the split-second nature of decisions for victims when 
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confronted with a crime that would have reasonably caused them death or serious bodily 
injury had they not defended themselves. The same argument holds that the court should 
not prosecute defendants for acting reasonably and prudently, nor should a person have to 
retreat from a threat before defending oneself. 
Opponents of stand-your-ground laws argue that such laws may lead to vigilantism, 
diminished reliance on legitimate law enforcement, and a decrease in the proportionality 
of actions of those seeking to defend themselves.243 An even more sinister consideration 
would come from those looking to commit a “justifiable murder” using existing stand-
your-ground laws to legitimize their actions. Of Hammer’s comment on “split-second 
decisions” and the presumption of innocence that accompanies stand-your-ground laws, 
Drake comments that “perhaps more emphasis should be placed on the facts in every 
circumstance to determine whether or not there was an imminent attack.”244 
Both the pro-gun and pro–gun control sides of the argument provide numerous 
cases to either prove or disprove the positive impact that stand-your-ground laws have 
had.245 The case that tragically brought the negative aspects of stand-your-ground laws to 
the forefront of public attention was the death of unarmed Trayvon Martin at the hands of 
George Zimmerman, a self-declared neighborhood watchman.246 Following a 
confrontation between the two, an altercation broke out, resulting in Zimmerman allegedly 
“fear[ing] for his life” and shooting Martin with his legally possessed, concealed 
handgun.247 According to Spitzer, Zimmerman’s lawyer did not explicitly invoke Florida’s 
stand-your-ground law in his defense.248 Instead, this law appears to have operated in the 
background of the case. For example, after the shooting of Martin, Zimmerman was not 
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arrested, and according to Spitzer, the preliminary investigation was not particularly 
thorough.249  
c. Adoption 
After the successful enactment of Florida’s stand-your-ground laws in 2005, the 
NRA and the American Legal Exchange Council (ALEC), another conservative legal 
organization, began working earnestly to promote similar legislation in other states.250 As 
of 2012, 16 states had enacted similar laws using the language from Florida’s legislation, 
and over 30 states have some form of castle doctrine laws.251 While ALEC stopped 
promoting its model stand-your-ground legislation in 2012 following backlash from the 
killing of Trayvon Martin, according to the Giffords Law Center, the NRA continues to 
advocate the adoption of such rules.252  
D. CONCLUSION 
As shall-issue/right-to-carry and stand-your-ground initiatives continue to gain 
popularity, law enforcement and emergency responders must adapt to the likelihood of 
increased interactions with armed individuals. These individuals likely believe not only 
that they are exercising their legal rights to have a concealed firearm but also that the use 
of deadly force is both justifiable and legal under a wide variety of conditions. These 
individuals may be further emboldened by the enumeration of these rights to be less 
cooperative with law enforcement and emergency service personnel because of the 
perception that their rights are being infringed upon. This condition may exist in stark 
contrast with the culture of law enforcement, fire department, and emergency service 
workers who are taught from day one to ensure that “the scene is safe” before 
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proceeding.253 Coupled with an expanded (and possibly justifiable) distrust of the 
intentions, competency, and legitimacy of government, law enforcement, firefighters, and 
EMS personnel may face difficult choices in how to interact with armed individuals while 
ensuring their safety and the protection of citizens’ rights. 
Furthermore, the advancements in both right-to-carry and stand-your-ground 
legislation should provide a cautionary tale to government and elected officials about how 
the actions of outside special interest groups can affect state law. Right-to-carry and stand-
your-ground laws have reduced government officials’ ability to regulate the carrying of 
firearms outside the home and complicated the investigation and prosecution of negligent 
firearm use. Finally, nuances in the wording of laws from state to state place added burden 
on public safety officials and prosecutors in how to interpret these laws.254 
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IV. SCENARIO 1: EVOLVING FACTORS IN RESPONSE 
TO MAN-MADE CRISIS EVENTS 
James Rivard, an officer with the Billings Police Department and Senior High’s 
school resource officer, woke up Friday morning feeling sick. He had been fighting the flu 
for two days, and it was not getting any better. He called the shift commander and Senior 
High’s principal, Mrs. Ostrund, informing them that he would not be at the school that day, 
feeling a twinge of guilt knowing that Fridays were always busy as the students geared up 
for the weekend. “It will be fine,” he decided. “The life of a school resource officer is pretty 
quiet.”  
Meanwhile, Mr. Kestler was getting dressed and readying himself for class that day. 
He knew he had a test to administer in fourth-period American history. Hopefully, he 
would have time to grade the pile of papers that had been growing on the corner of his 
desk. As he finished dressing, he slipped the holster for his concealed handgun onto his 
belt. He then checked to see that his Glock 19 was loaded—he inserted a magazine 
containing 15 rounds of frangible ammunition into the pistol. “Damn hassle,” he thought. 
“Oh well, you knew what you signed up for when you volunteered,” Kestler muttered to 
himself and continued dressing. 
Miles away, the shooter was deep in his thoughts. He had finally had enough. 
Today, they were all going to pay, everyone who had excluded or picked on him; his ex-
girlfriend, Cindy, who had broken up with him; and Mrs. Ostrund, who had suspended him 
for fighting. Both of his parents were already at work, so it was easy to get his dad’s AR-
15 out of their bedroom closet and break it down into two pieces that fit inside his oversized 
backpack. He also took the pistol that his parents kept in the nightstand and put it in the 
waistband of his pants.255 What extra magazines he could find went into the backpack as 
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well. Finally, he picked up the smoke grenade that he had bought online and stuck it in his 
pack. His plan was coming together.  
The shooter was able to slip in the side entrance to Senior High unnoticed. That 
door was always unlocked, especially when it was warm out. His plan was simple: stash 
the rifle in a locker-room locker—the locker room was usually empty this early. Then, he 
would hide in the nearby men’s bathroom until after first period began. After the first-
period bell, he would set off the smoke grenade in his locker and pull the fire alarm.256 He 
would then wait for the halls to fill with smoke (and hopefully victims), shoot them with 
the pistol as he retrieved the rifle from the locker room. He would then proceed upstairs to 
the second and third floors, hoping to catch as many people in the open as possible. The 
police would have to come to him. 
The first-period bell rang. The shooter waited for a minute, heart pounding, and left 
the bathroom. The hallway was almost empty, with only a couple of students hurrying to 
class. At his locker, he thought, “This is it! Goodbye, shitty world.” The smoke grenade, 
intended for airsoft games, had a pull-wire igniter. Hiding behind the open door of his 
locker, the shooter pulled the igniter, closed the locker door, and padlocked it shut. Within 
10 seconds, dark grey smoke began to pour from the vents in the locker door. The shooter 
calmly walked to the fire alarm and pulled down on the handle. As the fire alarm began to 
wail, he turned about-face and headed back toward the locker room. In the background, he 
could hear classroom doors opening, and as he turned into the locker room, he heard the 
first cries of “Fire!” “Yeah, fire, that’s what I’m about to do,” he thought. 
Inside the locker room, two boys were standing near the locker that held his rifle. 
Without hesitation, the shooter pulled the pistol from his waistband and shot each of them 
twice. Double-taps, he knew, always worked best in the videogames he played.257 The 
shooter doubted that anyone would have heard the gunfire from within the locker room 
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over the sound of the fire alarm. The rifle was right where he had left it, assembled and 
ready, when no one was there. The shooter turned around and headed for the hallway. 
The narrow hallways of Senior High were beginning to fill. The students seemed 
happy to be getting out of class—if only for a little while. A couple of teachers were 
approaching the shooter’s smoking locker, and the maintenance man was coming down the 
hallway with a fire extinguisher. He shot at them first. Mr. Edwards, a math teacher, seemed 
to realize instantly what was happening. “Steven—No!” he screamed, and then fell to the 
ground.  
The shooter smiled. “It’s working!” He then began to fire the rifle while heading 
toward the back stairs. Cindy, he knew, had American history during first period. 
On the second floor, Mr. Kestler had just handed out tests to the students when the 
fire alarm began to sound. That’s odd, he thought. No fire drills had been scheduled for 
today. Just some kids trying to get out of class early, he mused. Then, faintly, he heard 
what had to be fireworks coming from the first floor, but the cadence of explosions was 
off. Then the screaming started. 
Mr. Kestler had been one of the first teachers to sign up for the Billings School 
District’s School Guardian Program. Loosely modeled after the Texas school marshal 
program, this voluntary program provided training and authorization for school district 
staff to carry concealed weapons while on school grounds, to be used defensively in the 
event of an active shooter.258 Mr. Kestler had completed his training two years previously, 
and while no incidents had caused any of the school marshals in the district to deploy their 
weapons, Mr. Kestler remained acutely aware of the controversy that armed staff members 
had created within the district.  
While Montana is a gun-friendly state, both parent and teacher groups had met the 
program with resistance out of concern for the students’ safety and emotional well-being. 
 
258 Rostron, “School Shootings and the Legislative Push,” 450. Rostron states that a Texas school 
marshal shall undergo 80 hours of training, be able to legally obtain a concealed weapon permit, and pass 
both a background check and psychological screening. While reports indicate that the program has been 
adopted by rural school districts, larger cities in Texas seem to be opposed to appointing school marshals. 
Furthermore, Texas law allows only one school marshal for every 400 students. 
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Because the district was self-insuring, it was able to negotiate liability issues in arming 
school staff. At the launch of the program, the district had partnered with the Billings Police 
Department and the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office to implement both a firearm 
training program consistent with state law and, more importantly, crisis intervention team 
training for all of the district’s school guardian volunteers. Mr. Kestler and the rest of the 
teachers who had gone through the weapons training had also been instructed in emergency 
first-aid procedures by members of the Billings Police and Fire Departments.259 Proper 
training and emergency procedures were in place—in writing—and rehearsed annually.260 
Parental and union resistance to the program had grown in the last year following a 
negligent, accidental firearm discharge by an armed teacher on school grounds.261 
All of these facts disappeared from Mr. Kestler’s mind when he heard what could 
only be gunfire coming from the first floor. Mr. Kestler immediately initiated the 
emergency plan as per district policy. Step one was to initiate the “run-hide-fight” program. 
Mr. Kestler immediately locked the door to the classroom. He then began moving all of 
the students to a corner of the room not visible from the window in the door. As he turned 
out the classroom lights, he instructed the students to turn off their cell phones. While most 
of the class seemed to be in a state of shock, several of the students assisted Mr. Kestler in 
moving his desk in front of the doorway. Unfortunately, despite Mr. Kestler’s instructions, 
many of the students were on their cell phones typing away. Mr. Kestler finally positioned 
himself in a “hard corner” of the room, near the students where he could not be seen easily 
from the doorway window. Much to the surprise of his students, who were unaware that he 
 
259 Wood, “The Next Generation of Active Shooter Response.” Wood suggests that as a proactive 
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was a school guardian, Mr. Kestler drew his handgun and chambered a round in the 
pistol.262 He stood there, visibly shaken, waiting. From outside the classroom, the sound of 
gunfire was drawing closer. 
Five blocks away from Senior High, Sergeant Davidson was the first to receive the 
frantic notification from the 9-1-1 center that a possible active shooter situation was 
underway at the school. Sergeant Davidson was one of seven patrol officers on duty city-
wide. He immediately sped toward the school. Upon arriving at the front of the school, 
Sergeant Davidson faced a dilemma. As the first arriving officer, his training told him that 
he must immediately enter the school and engage the shooter. However, as the ranking 
patrol officer, it was also Sergeant Davidson’s responsibility to assume command of the 
incident and direct other officers and responders. For Sergeant Davidson, it was no contest. 
In light of the controversy surrounding the failure of school resource officer and Broward 
County Deputy Scot Peterson’s failure to enter Marjorie Stoneman High School and 
subdue the shooter, many law enforcement agencies changed the expectation of their 
officers from “may” engage to “shall” engage an active shooter.263 This would prove to be 
a terrible mistake. 
Just as Sergeant Davidson was arriving at Senior High School, David McCormick 
looked down at his buzzing phone—he had just received a text message from his daughter, 
Cindy. When he opened the message, he gasped. “Dad, there is an active shooter at our 
school!” it read. David could not believe it and stood in surprise for a full minute. He knew 
what he had to do. Senior High was only a mile away.  
“Mark, there is a shooting at Senior,” he told his co-worker. “I am going there 
now!”  
“I’ll go with you,” said Mark.  
 
262 Lana M. Minshew, “From the Editorial Board: On Arming K-12 Teachers,” High School Journal 
101, no. 3 (Spring 2018): 132, https://doi.org/10.1353/hsj.2018.0006. There is much debate about how 
arming teachers affects students’ mental well-being and feelings of security in schools. According to 
Minshew, no studies have surveyed student opinions about having armed teachers in classrooms.  
263 Kalhan Rosenblatt, “Broward County Officials Change Shooting-Response Policy after Lessons 
Learned in Parkland School Massacre,” NBC News, December 26, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ 
us-news/broward-county-officials-change-shooting-response-policy-after-lessons-learned-n952036. 
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David grabbed his handgun from his desk drawer. There was another handgun in 
his car—he would give that to Mark. No way was some kid going to kill his daughter. 
David and Mark were only two of dozens of parents who received such messages from 
their children in the minutes following the shooter’s first shots. They would not be the only 
ones to drop what they were doing and go immediately to Senior High. And, they were not 
the only ones armed.264 
Inside Senior High, Mr. Kestler could hear the sound of gunfire outside his door. 
Screams from students in the hall and the sound of the fire alarm made it almost impossible 
to focus. Two or three minutes had passed since Mr. Kestler had heard the first sounds of 
gunfire. When the first volley of bullets cut through the glass window of the door, everyone 
in the classroom screamed and tried to hide further in the room’s corner. Soon a hand 
appeared through the shattered glass and began fumbling at the door lock. As the door 
swung to the outside, the grinning face of the shooter soon replaced it. Then the muzzle 
flashes started. 
The shooter yelled, “Where are you, Cindy?” and began randomly firing into the 
classroom.  
Mr. Kestler, afraid for his life and the lives of his students, returned fire. As Mr. 
Kestler pressed the trigger of his Glock pistol for the third time, something obstructed his 
view, and then it was clear again. As he refocused on the doorway, he noticed that the 
shooter was no longer there. The classroom was full of screaming. At least one student was 
lying motionless on the ground. The floor was covered in red. From the hallway, there was 
one more shot. Mr. Kestler slowly moved toward the classroom door to see whether it was 
safe. 
Meanwhile, Sergeant Davidson was racing to the entrance of Senior High. A steady 
stream of students was pouring out the door. Sergeant Davidson kept asking them where 
 
264 Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behaviors in Disasters, 1–4, 40–46; and Buerger and Buerger, 
“Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” 6–7. The convergence of people on disaster scenes is a well-
documented phenomenon. One subset of convergers identified by Fritz and Mathewson are those intending 
to render assistance. These “helpers,” state Fritz and Mathewson, may provide informal solutions in the 
absence of formal ones. Buerger and Buerger warn that in an active shooter situation, especially in rural 
areas, the arrival of armed citizen responders should be anticipated. 
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the shooter was but received no clear answer. The fire alarm was still sounding, and the 
hallway was full of smoke. Finally, one student said, “He’s on the second floor!”  
As Sergeant Davidson moved into the building, he could hear gunshots ahead. He 
passed the bodies of several students and adults as he moved to the second floor. As 
Sergeant Davidson rounded the corner, he saw a figure dressed in a plaid shirt and jeans, 
standing with a handgun pointed at a student on the floor. “Drop the gun! Drop the gun!” 
Sergeant Davidson yelled. 
Blocks away from the school, two fire trucks and two ambulances pulled into a fire 
lane, following active shooter response protocol. As the firefighters began donning the 
protective armor and helmets that the department had issued two years before, the fire 
captain tried to communicate with the lead police officer on the scene. She knew that the 
rescue task force could only be deployed once a unified police/fire command had been 
established. She was met with radio silence. The fire captain then tried to communicate 
with the 9-1-1 dispatcher and requested additional engines and ambulances. Only three 
ambulances were on duty that day, and the third was on another call. 
As the fire captain sat there wondering what to do next, she began observing more 
and more cars converging on the street in front of the school. As drivers exited their cars, 
the fire captain realized, “Shit, those guys have guns!”  
The fire captain then ordered the other engine and two ambulances to move farther 
away from the scene. There was still no contact with an on-scene law enforcement officer. 
While she was waiting, the fire captain had the foresight to notify the two trauma centers 
that an active shooter scenario was unfolding and that the hospitals should prepare for a 
mass casualty event. 
When David and Mark arrived at the front of Senior High, it was chaos. Dozens of 
students were fleeing the grounds of the school. Some students appeared to be wounded, 
and there was at least one body on the front stairs of the school. Only one police car was 
present, and no one was obviously in charge.  
“Come on, Mark,” David said, starting for the door, pistol in hand. As they moved 
toward the school, at least five other cars of visibly anxious parents pulled up rapidly in 
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the school bus loading area next to the street, effectively blocking the street from 
approaching traffic—including law enforcement. 
On the second floor of Senior High, the boy in plaid turned and swung the pistol 
toward Sergeant Davidson, who had no other choice but to press the trigger on his patrol 
rifle. As he did, Sergeant Davidson caught a glimpse of a beard on the man in plaid, but it 
was too late to stop the bullets that raced down the hall, striking Mr. Kestler and dropping 
him where he stood.265 Mr. Kestler—after returning fire toward the shooter, seeing the 
empty doorway, and hearing a final gunshot from the hallway—had exited the classroom. 
As he stood in the hallway, covering the body of the shooter with his handgun, he had heard 
yelling from behind him, and without thinking, had turned to face the threat. As he saw the 
uniformed police officer pointing a gun at him out of the corner of his eye, Mr. Kestler’s 
last thought was, “What was I thinking?” 
In the meantime, three other Billings Police officers and two county deputies had 
arrived at the school. Because the city and county operated on different radio frequencies, 
they could not communicate directly with each other. After meeting face-to-face, they 
decided to enter the school and begin searching for the shooter. As the city officers entered 
the building, they finally received notification from Sergeant Davidson that he had 
neutralized a shooter on the second floor. However, the city officers had no way to 
communicate with the deputies.  
As the deputies moved past the bodies of the injured and dead, a man who looked 
like a teacher approached them, saying, “I just saw two men with guns by the front office!” 
The deputies immediately began moving in the direction the teacher had indicated. 
Outside, the fire captain and the crews of both fire engines and the ambulances were 
still waiting to establish command with law enforcement. They had gone over the 
procedures for implementing rescue task force operations and were ready to go. 
 
265 DeMitchell, “Locked Down and Armed,” 291. The specter of a law enforcement officer 
accidentally mistaking an armed teacher for the active shooter is a concern frequently raised by the 
opponents of the armed-teacher paradigm. As told by DeMitchell, after taking part in a simulated active 
shooter training scenario in which he accidentally shot a teacher attempting to subdue a shooter, an 
Arkansas state senator said, “The tough part is when law enforcement does arrive, it’s hard to distinguish 
between the good guys with guns and the bad guys with gun[s].” 
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Unfortunately, protocols demanded that they establish a unified command with a senior 
law enforcement officer before commencing rescue operations. As the crews stood by 
watching the chaos ensue, it became clear that it would be nearly impossible to get the 
ambulances close to the entrance of the school. Minutes later, the fire dispatcher instructed 
the fire captain to meet Sergeant Davidson at the main entrance of the school. It took almost 
10 minutes for the linkup to take place. 
As Sergeant Davidson briefed the fire department crews on the location of the 
victims, the two sheriff’s deputies had problems of their own. As they moved down the 
hallway toward the school office, they observed two men yelling at someone behind the 
glass of the office. One man was plainly holding a handgun. As the deputies approached, 
they began yelling at the men to drop their weapons and place their hands in the air. The 
sight of uniformed officers with weapons pointed at them caused the two men to follow 
directions. The deputies handcuffed and searched each man. They then moved the men to 
one of their patrol cars. As the deputies exited the school with the men in custody, a large 
crowd of parents, media, children, and bystanders gathered by their patrol cars. Demands 
for information further slowed the deputies’ activities. The men’s claims of innocence and 
demands to see their children were ignored. This process took another 15 minutes.  
Sergeant Davidson directed the three additional police officers to serve as a 
protective detail for the fire crews performing rescue task force activities. Having practiced 
these tactics several times over the last two years, the police and fire crews worked well 
together and began triaging, treating, and transporting the injured to the awaiting 
ambulances. However, because of the traffic jam created by all of the people who had 
converged on the scene, transportation of the more seriously wounded was difficult. The 
number of victims forced the ambulances to do laps back and forth from each hospital. It 
would be another 40 minutes before ambulances from neighboring communities arrived on 
scene. Finally, one officer called for a city bus to move those with minor injuries, leaving 
the ambulances for the most seriously wounded. 
As the joint police and fire rescue task force made its way to the second floor, they 
found the bodies of the shooter and Mr. Kestler still lying in the hallway. As the task force 
entered Mr. Kestler’s classroom, they found that all the students had already evacuated the 
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room. There was only one student casualty in the classroom. One of the police officers 
remarked, “It looks like this one was shot from behind.”  
“Yeah,” replied the other officer. “Sarge said the students had told him that when 
the shooter opened fire, this kid stood up just as the teacher was returning fire and was hit 
by the teacher.”  
“Well, maybe it is a good thing he did not make it then,” replied the first officer, 
“How could you live with that on your conscience?”  
“I don’t know,” said the second officer. “Ask sarge. He shot the teacher when the 
guy turned around with a gun in his hand.”  
“Shit.”  
“Yeah, shit is right,” sighed the second officer. 
In the end, the police spokesman told the media that nine people, including the 
shooter, had been killed, and 17 more were injured by gunfire in an event that had lasted 
approximately seven minutes from the first shot till Sergeant Davidson mistakenly shot 
Mr. Kestler.266 Of the nine dead, three deaths were attributed to the delayed response of 
the rescue task force. Twenty-seven more people had been injured while escaping. Both 
Mark and David were charged with carrying firearms on school property and interfering 
with a police investigation. Sergeant Davidson took an early medical retirement from the 
police department after suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder over 
the errant killing of Mr. Kestler. The parents of the student accidentally killed by Mr. 
Kestler filed a lawsuit against the Billings Public School District and the estate of Mr. 
Kestler because the “injury was caused by a government-created danger . . . [and the] 
municipality [had] failed to adequately train its employees after implementing a policy that 
clearly necessitate[d] proper training.”267 A class-action lawsuit was filed by the victims 
of the shooting against both the shooter’s parents for failing to secure their firearms 
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adequately and the Billings Police Department for negligence in not having an SRO present 
that day. 
A. ANALYSIS 
This scenario described several of the challenges facing law enforcement and other 
public safety agencies stemming from a crisis event. Jones notes that on October 10, 2013, 
Taft Union High School District in California experienced an active shooter situation in 
which the shooter specifically targeted another student.268 Unfortunately, the assigned SRO 
was absent that day. The victim survived his injuries and brought suit against the school 
district, which in turn, filed a complaint against the city of Taft, alleging that had an SRO 
been present that day, the shooter would have been deterred and the shooting prevented.269 
While the city of Taft claimed immunity, the court overruled the motion, leaving the nature 
of the city’s liability in question.270  
This case illustrates that law enforcement organizations who contract with school 
districts to provide armed security may be accepting the risks that accompany the provision 
of such services. The scenario also illustrates how school districts and armed staff members 
may take on additional liability through the doctrine of government-created danger. A 
second issue the scenario raises is that even when armed school staff members have 
received proper training and use proper equipment, there is still a significant possibility of 
human error. DeMitchell cites an example of armed school staff proponent Arkansas State 
Senator Jeremy Hutchinson accidentally shooting another armed school staff member 
during a simulated training scenario as representing “the fog of war” that will almost 
certainly accompany such an event.271 However, no school district with policies for the 
arming of staff members has made such policies mandatory. Instead, the programs are 
entirely voluntary for eligible staff members. It seems unlikely that school staff members 
who are unwilling or unable to accept the risks and responsibilities of carrying a firearm in 
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defense of their students would volunteer for such a program. Additionally, a thorough 
training program, such as the one in Texas, may compel others to opt out of the program 
or fail to meet the approved standards for armed school staff so as not to be granted the 
ability to carry a firearm on campus.272 
Senator Hutchinson’s failure to correctly identify another good guy with a gun 
highlights the further challenges that armed school staff members, law enforcement, and 
other responders will face due to the principle of convergence. As armed and unarmed 
responders and citizens move toward the disaster site, it will become nearly impossible to 
tell the good guys from the bad. Because law enforcement will treat any armed individual 
as a suspect, the convergence of armed citizens and possibly non-uniformed law 
enforcement officers will tie up critical resources at a time when they are most needed. In 
a worst-case scenario, the convergence of armed citizens may lead to a “blue-on-blue” 
incident, where one good guy mistakes another good guy for a bad guy and shoots him, 
resulting in further injuries or deaths. Furthermore, managing the convergence of people 
and materiel will deplete the number of public safety officers available to assist the injured. 
Unfortunately, statistics suggest that waiting for a law enforcement response could 
have a high human cost. The first person encountered by an active shooter is often the first 
victim.273 Once the killing begins, someone is shot on average every 15 seconds for an 
average of three to four minutes.274 Ultimately, in 40 percent of active shooter incidents, 
shooter suicide or citizen intervention has ended the event before law enforcement’s 
arrival.275 These statistics create a strong argument for solutions to active shooter violence 
beyond the traditional law enforcement response. Programs like run-hide-fight may reduce 
the numbers of casualties at the scene of an active shooter event but are unlikely to end the 
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event.276 Knowing the statistics, school districts will likely continue to look for ways to 
mitigate the active shooter threat such as by arming school staff. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Sandy Hook school shooting has ignited the ongoing debate over 
how to best secure schools in the United States. While the policy over arming school staff 
members is still being debated, the idea of armed civilians at crisis events must be planned 
for now, more than ever. Whether armed civilians are present at these crisis events as part 
of an organization’s formal policy or they arrive as members of the public converging as 
armed citizen responders, law enforcement and emergency service leaders must take a 
proactive approach in managing these encounters. 
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V. SCENARIO 2: EVOLVING GUN-RELATED FACTORS 
IN RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS 
As Deputy Valdez drove down the gravel road, the smoke column from the massive 
fire could be seen in the distance. It was getting closer. In light of the county 
commissioner’s declaration of emergency, he had been ordered to start directing residents 
of the county to evacuate their homes. The county’s other three deputies and the 
undersheriff were coordinating road closures with the county sheriff, who was back in the 
emergency operations center. The fire had already burned over 10,000 acres of grassland 
and was now being driven toward the low hills south of Roundup by winds gusting more 
than 50 miles per hour. Deputy Valdez knew that if the fire made it into the hills and valleys 
of the Bull Mountains, it would be almost impossible to put out, and the number of houses 
that would be destroyed would go way up. 
The first two property owners that Deputy Valdez had advised to begin evacuating 
seemed happy to do so and already appeared to be loading personal belongings into their 
vehicles. However, as Deputy Valdez approached the Armstrong Ranch, he had few 
illusions that things would go as smoothly. The Armstrong Ranch sat at the bottom of the 
valley and could easily be identified by the large Confederate flag flying over the metal 
shop building near the road. The Armstrongs had a long history of interactions with the 
Musselshell County Sheriff’s Office over everything from tax disputes to bad relations with 
their neighbors. The irony was that John Armstrong frequently told anyone who would 
listen that the county sheriffs were the only constitutional law enforcement officers in the 
state. 
When Deputy Valdez pulled onto the long driveway leading up to the Armstrong 
Ranch, he noticed a new no-trespassing sign posted at the intersection with Jamison Creek 
Road. Deputy Valdez noticed a sizeable number of trucks, people, and activity at the ranch 
house. As he put his truck in park, he saw the obvious figure of John Armstrong breaking 
away from the group of men and heading his way. “What do you want, deputy?” Armstrong 
called out. 
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“Hi, John. I’m coming by to let everyone know that the fire is about five miles out, 
and it’ll be here by tomorrow morning if the winds keep up. The county commissioners 
have declared a state of emergency and have ordered mandatory evacuations,” Valdez 
replied. 
“Mandatory, huh?” Armstrong snorted. “I don’t think so. I’ve got 200 head of cattle 
out there, so unless you’re going to round them up yourself, my family and neighbors will 
be right here working through the night.” 
“Well, look, John,” Valdez replied, “we need to have everyone out of here as soon 
as possible to keep the roads open for the firefighting crews and to keep the area secure for 
everyone who has already left. Plus, we can’t guarantee anyone’s safety—we’re just spread 
too thin.” 
“Those are your problems, deputy, not ours. I guess if the sheriff doesn’t like it, he 
can come down here himself, but he’s going to get the same response. We can take care of 
ourselves and our property, so feel free to head out the way you came in.” 
By this time, a number of the ranchers who had been by the house had come down 
to hear the dialog between Deputy Valdez and Armstrong. Several of them nodded their 
heads in agreement with Armstrong, and Valdez heard at least one of them mutter, “Don’t 
bother coming back unless you have a horse and a rope.” Valdez noticed that many of the 
ranchers were openly carrying handguns on their hips. 
“Please, John,” Valdez tried again. “I need you to understand what we are up 
against here. We are trying to save everyone’s lives and property. There’s a strike force of 
fire engines and water tenders, and a bulldozer heading this way. They need to operate in 
here, and all these people and trucks are just making that harder.”  
“The last thing we need is a bunch of strangers cutting our fences, sucking the stock 
ponds dry, and wrecking all of our pasture. I think you saw the no-trespassing sign back 
there. If you missed it, feel free to check it out as you’re leaving. It applies to you, too. This 
is private property. You do not get to tell us how to take care of it or our families. You 
should leave now. We are standing our ground,” he said, as he and the others turned back 
toward the house. 
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Sensing that further discussion was a waste of time, Deputy Valdez turned his truck 
around and headed back to Jamison Creek. There were other homeowners he needed to 
notify. Valdez knew he would have to call the sheriff to see what to do next. As he headed 
back toward town, he noticed two of the other ranchers had pulled in behind him, and one 
proceeded to block the westerly approach to Jamison Creek Road with a truck before 
heading back with the second rancher.  
“This is going to be a problem,” Deputy Valdez thought. Then, he got on the radio. 
Fifteen miles on the east side of Jamison Creek Road, the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM)’s Engine 66 was using GPS to map the perimeter of the fire and figure 
out how firefighting units could best access the blaze. Dan Johnson, E66’s engine boss, 
was happy to have a member of the Musselshell County Rural Fire Department riding with 
him. Not only did Tom Ryan know all of the property owners in the area, but he knew 
where most of the two-track ranch roads, water springs, and fence-line gates were. Face it, 
Johnson thought, no kind of fed is popular in these parts. Johnson decided that when they 
made it back to Jamison Creek Road, they would head west toward State Road 3 and make 
a full circle around the perimeter of the fire. 
During a terse five-minute radio conversation, the sheriff reiterated his previous 
instructions to Deputy Valdez. All of the 150 or so residents of Jamison Creek needed to 
evacuate immediately for accountability purposes and to leave the road open for the 
firefighters and their equipment. The weather report did not look promising, according to 
the sheriff: the fire had nearly doubled in size in just three hours, and high winds were still 
pushing the fire toward Jamison Creek. The sheriff promised to dispatch an officer from 
the Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) to meet Deputy Valdez to facilitate evacuating 
Jamison Creek. As Deputy Valdez sat waiting for the MHP officer to arrive, he saw two 
semi-trucks with cattle trailers turn onto Jamison Creek Road. One of the drivers smiled at 
Valdez and waved. The other flipped him off. 
About 45 minutes later, a Dodge Charger with MHP logos on the side pulled up 
alongside Valdez at the intersection of County Road 3 and Jamison Creek Road. The officer 
got out and introduced himself to Valdez as Officer Huston. He told Valdez that he was 
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from the Great Falls District, about 150 miles away, and that he had been ordered down to 
Musselshell County to assist with firefighting operations. Valdez had never met him before 
this morning. 
“Sheriff Bell told me that some of the residents are not willing to leave and that you 
need a hand getting them to evacuate,” the patroller said to Valdez. Valdez explained the 
situation, noting that there were at least 50 people still on Jamison Creek. The problem, he 
said, was that most of the people still there were worried about saving their livestock. He 
also told the patroller about how the road was being blocked off and how several tractor-
trailers had gone down the road, presumably to help Armstrong and the others move their 
cattle out. Valdez also explained to Huston how vital the cattle were to the ranchers’ 
livelihood and that the residents of Jamison Creek might not be willing to leave without 
them. 
Valdez and Huston proceeded back down Jamison Creek Road toward Armstrong 
Ranch. There was still activity at several of the houses along the road. As they approached 
the Armstrong Ranch, they saw that the roadway had been entirely blocked by one of the 
semi-trucks and the pickup that had followed Valdez when he had left earlier. John 
Armstrong’s oldest son Kirk was sitting in the truck and got out of the cab as Valdez and 
Huston approached. 
Valdez noted as they pulled up that only a narrow corridor of the road was open 
between the ditch and the parked semi, and it was blocked on the far end by Kirk 
Armstrong’s truck. Not only would no fire apparatus be able to pass, but it also created a 
natural choke-point for the two officers and their vehicles. As Valdez came to a stop, he 
noticed that Armstrong was armed with a handgun just like the others up at the ranch house. 
As Valdez exited his truck, Armstrong spoke: “Dad said you were going to be back. 
Until we get all the cattle down here, we are not leaving. Why don’t you go find someone 
who wants your help, and leave us alone? You’re just wasting your time here.” 
“Look, Kirk…” Valdez began. 
From behind him, Huston cut him off. “I’m Officer Huston with the Montana 
Highway Patrol. Both the Musselshell County commissioners and the governor have 
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declared a county-wide emergency. You all need to open up this roadway and evacuate 
immediately.” 
“Where do you think you’re at, Malheur?” came a voice from behind them.  
Valdez looked up and saw two men standing atop the semi. Each held a rifle pointed 
casually at the ground, but the intent was pretty clear to Deputy Valdez. He noticed that 
Kirk Armstrong’s hand had come to rest on the butt of his holstered handgun. 
“Why don’t you head back the way you came, deputy? We will be along as soon as 
we get the cattle taken care of,” the first man said. “And as for you,” he gestured toward 
Officer Huston, “go back to Billings or wherever you came from. You don’t have any 
standing here. Not today.” 
Before Huston could respond, Valdez said, “Let’s go Huston. Let these men get 
back to work.” Huston glared at him but returned to his Charger while taking a hard look 
at each man. 
“Oh, and tell the governor that we’re keeping our guns. This is not the Virgin 
Islands, and he is not Ken Mapp,” said the second man from the top of the truck.  
As Kirk Armstrong watched the two law enforcement officers back down Jamison 
Creek Road, he decided he had better check with his father to see whether Steve Boyer and 
a couple of the other men could close Jamison Creek Road on the east side of the ranch. 
No sense having any surprise visitors, he concluded. 
Dan Johnson and E66 had just come to the intersection between the two-track ranch 
road they had been following and Jamison Creek Road. Johnson thought for a minute about 
heading east to Highway 87 and then continuing to Roundup and the emergency operations 
center. Figuring that it would add only about an hour and a half to the trip, he decided to 
turn west on Jamison Creek Road so that he could make an entire trip around the outer 
perimeter of the fire. He tried to contact the emergency operations center (EOC) with both 
his radio and cell phone but was unable to raise either the EOC or any of the other engines 
working the fire.  
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“Well fellas, let’s swing around the head of the fire and get a look at where it is 
heading next,” Dan said to Tom Ryan and the two other crew members of E66. Instead of 
turning back toward town, they turned west toward the Armstrong Ranch. 
Back at the intersection of County Road 3 and Jamison Creek Road, to the west of 
the Armstrong Ranch, Valdez and Huston were having a heated discussion over what had 
transpired. Huston had just finished tearing into Valdez about pulling back from the 
confrontation with Kirk Armstrong and the two men atop the semi. 
“Look,” Huston complained, “those guys need to follow the rule of law. We are 
here under orders trying to save them. Can you believe they threatened us? Then, of all the 
things, you pull us out of there!” 
“Nothing more was going to be accomplished by arguing with them, at least not 
right then,” Valdez said. “Those people are fighting for their livelihood. Besides, they had 
us at a tactical disadvantage. I was not going to press our luck. Besides, since the governor 
went on CNN and said he wants to ban assault rifles, law enforcement is not very popular—
not up here anyway. The last thing I was going to let happen was the start of a gunfight. If 
they want to get burned out, then who are we to stop them?” 
“Well that is fine,” Huston replied, “but what about all of the other people’s 
property that’ll likely burn when we can’t send firefighting units in there to stop the fire—
because of those clowns?”  
“You’re right about that,” said Valdez, “but we can’t let any responders go down 
the road. They’re just going to get tangled up in that mess, and who knows what the 
Armstrongs will do then! I’ll get on the radio and call the sheriff. We’ll see if he wants to 
reposition some of the fire engines and equipment that were supposed to come here. We 
cannot let their B.S. get in the way of firefighting operations. That has got to stay the top 
priority.” 
Engine 66 was moving down Jamison Creek Road about six miles east from the 
intersection with County Road 3 when it came around a tight corner and halted abruptly. 
Sitting in the middle of Jamison Creek Road was a single pickup with a man holding a rifle 
behind it. 
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After stopping suddenly, Johnson rolled down his window in time to hear the man 
behind the truck holler, “The road is closed boys. Better head back the way you came!” 
“What the hell is this?” Johnson exclaimed. 
“Let me go find out,” said Ryan, exiting the fire engine. 
“What are you doing with the feds, Tom?” the man behind the truck called out. 
“Trying to stop this fire before it burns everything to the ground,” Tom replied. “Is 
that you, Steve?” Ryan continued, recognizing the rancher behind the truck as Steve Boyer, 
a friend of the Armstrongs. 
“Yep, and listen, Tom, we already had a run-in with the sheriff and Highway Patrol. 
Until we get everyone’s cattle out, we are keeping the road shut down. We can’t have all 
those firetrucks blocking the way out,” Steve replied. 
“Well, I’m guessing the deputy told you all the same thing,” Tom replied. “We’re 
just trying to get a handle on how big this fire is and how to best access it. How about you 
let us through so we can get back around this whole thing? We have a strike team of 
engines, tenders, and bulldozers heading this way. That is the best way to put this thing out 
and save everyone’s cattle, not just the Armstrong Ranch.” 
“You’re not going to put that fire out with a few fire engines, and besides, as soon 
as it gets close, you’re just going to pull back to the road and let all of our homes burn 
anyway. We might as well save what we can, while we can,” Steve retorted. 
As the men stood facing each other, two more white pickups came around the 
corner, barely missing the BLM engine before coming to a stop. The passenger in the front 
truck unrolled his window and hollered, “Hey, I’m Pete McCormack. My dad lives up on 
Summit Ridge Road behind the Armstrong Ranch. He’s out of town, and I need to get 
whatever I can from his place before it burns! I just ran into a Highway Patrol roadblock 
on 87—I need to get through!” 
The man with the rifle seemed to consider this for a moment and then spoke. “All 
right, you two,” he said gesturing to McCormack and the men in the two white trucks. 
“Head on up to your dad’s place. Just stay out of the way of the cattle. As for you guys, 
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Tom, I’ll let Armstrong and them know that you’re coming through, but don’t cause any 
trouble over there because they have plenty of problems without you making things worse.” 
Valdez and Huston were still talking outside their vehicles at the intersection of 
County Road 3 and Jamison Creek Road. Huston had called back to the county EOC, 
relayed the situation at the Armstrong Ranch, and requested more law enforcement backup. 
Valdez, having more appreciation for the problems and personalities involved, had called 
the sheriff to see whether he or one of the county commissioners, whom Armstrong 
respected, would come down and try to talk some sense into Armstrong in person. Both 
officers’ requests had been moved up the chain of command, but no resolution had been 
forthcoming. The sun was at the highest point in the sky when Valdez saw the first of the 
fire apparatuses coming toward them.  
A mix of BLM, county, and volunteer fire engines and a county water tender soon 
came to a stop next to the two parked officers. A bulldozer could be seen lumbering slowly 
behind the four fire apparatuses. The lead engine’s engine boss called out, “Hey, we are 
here to start ‘dozing a line up along the south ridge as a fire break and protect any houses 
that we can. Where do you want us to start?” 
Valdez called back, “Nowhere right now. The Armstrong Ranch has the road 
blocked—they are trying to get all of their cattle out.” 
“Well, tell them to move, dammit. We can’t stop the fire if we can’t get up to the 
ridge!” the engine boss called back. “Go down there and tell them to get the hell out of the 
way!” 
“They made it pretty clear they are not leaving until every cow they can load is 
loaded,” Valdez said. 
“Yeah, and they are armed! They threatened us when we told them to move,” 
Huston added. 
“Dumb SOBs! Don’t they know that we will be fighting this thing until the snow 
falls if that fire crests the ridge and gets in the timber?” the Engine Boss exclaimed. 
“They know—they just don’t care,” Huston responded.  
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“Well, if there is no access, and the scene is not safe, I’m not taking this strike force 
in there. I guess we just let it burn and catch it on the next ridge to the north, whatever good 
that will do!” said the engine boss. 
As Huston and the engine boss argued up the road, E66 was making its way past 
the Armstrong Ranch to where Kirk Armstrong’s pickup blocked Jamison Creek Road 
along with the empty semi-truck.  
When E66 pulled up, perpendicular to the parked truck, Armstrong got out of the 
cab, rifle in hand. “Steve radioed me and said he let you through, Tom. Who is your 
buddy?” Armstrong said.  
“Look, Kirk, we are just trying to get a handle on how to stop this fire. There is a 
strike force of engines and a bulldozer supposed to be coming in to put a fire line along the 
ridge as soon as they can. We are GPSing the route for them. We need to get through to let 
them know where to go,” Tom responded.  
“You guys don’t get it! That’s going to cause a traffic jam down here and keep us 
from moving our cattle out. Now you can keep going, but the next car that comes back 
down that road is going to get shot. I’m done warning you all to stay out.” 
Kirk Armstrong moved his truck and waved E66 through the impromptu roadblock. 
E66 continued down Jamison Creek Road until it reached the intersection of Highway 3. 
As they pulled up to the mass of vehicles staged at the intersection, Dan Johnson noted 
there was a bigger mess at the intersection than down by the Armstrong Ranch. 
In addition to the fire department strike force, several pickup trucks had arrived 
and were trying to get past Officer Huston, who was arguing with one of the men 
outside his patrol car. It was clear that the men in the trucks intended to help the Armstrongs 
and that Officer Huston was refusing to let them proceed down Jamison Creek Road. 
Johnson and Ryan got out of E66 and joined the two officers and the engine boss 
from the strike force near the two officer’s vehicles. “Hey, fellas, I’m Dan Johnson with 
the BLM. We were mapping the head of the fire and just ran into those guys down at the 
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ranch. They say they’re not opening that road anytime soon and told us to get out.” Johnson 
sounded exasperated. 
“Look,” said Valdez, “I have called the sheriff and the county commissioners to see 
whether one of them will come down and talk some sense into Armstrong and the others. 
I haven’t heard anything back from them, but even if they left now, it could be 45 minutes 
to an hour before they get here. By that time, it may be too late to get these guys,” gesturing 
to the strike force, “in there to stop the fire.” 
Tom Ryan spoke up, “Well, I know the Armstrongs, and I know what is important 
to them. First off, they have no faith in any of us to stop that fire. Second, they looked 
pretty serious about not letting us back down there without there being some real trouble. 
Third, they don’t like strangers or people from the government telling them what to do on 
their land. I have a few ideas about what to do here, but you all are going to have to trust 
Deputy Valdez and me.” Ryan went on to outline his plan to the group. Ten minutes later, 
E66 was on its way back down Jamison Creek Road. 
As they approached the makeshift roadblock, they noticed the empty semi had been 
replaced by one whose trailer was full of cattle. Kirk Armstrong was already out in front 
of the truck, rifle in hand. “Thanks for agreeing to ride down here with me in the engine, 
deputy. I think they will be less anxious seeing us in this than in your patrol car,” Ryan 
declared. 
“I hope so. The last thing we want is any trouble,” Valdez responded. 
“Hey Kirk,” Ryan called out as they got close enough to be heard, “it’s Tom Ryan 
from the fire department. Deputy Valdez and I need to talk to you or your dad. We do not 
want any trouble, and we’re not going to make any for you.” 
Kirk Armstrong’s rifle stayed pointed at the ground as he called back. “What now, 
Tom? I thought I told you not to come back down here.” 
Ryan spoke up. “Kirk, Deputy Valdez and I have a plan that gets you and your 
cattle out of here safely but still lets us get a handle on that fire before it burns everyone on 
Jamison Creek out. Here is what I propose: We keep all traffic off Jamison Creek Road 
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headed east so you and your family can move out that way and not get in a traffic jam that 
direction. You let us bring our strike force down to where we are, and they can start cutting 
a ‘dozer line in from here up to Summit Ridge Road, west across the top of the ridge and 
back down to Jamison Creek. We won’t interfere with any of your operations, and you can 
move out to the east. How does that sound?”  
“I will check with dad, but we are about half done now, so as long as it’s just the 
fire engines and dozer, that will probably work. Just no more cops, no offense,” Armstrong 
replied, glancing at Valdez. 
“Two things concern me,” Valdez said. “First, I can’t have anybody threatening or 
interfering with the fire crew once they go to work. They are a little nervous about all the 
hardware you guys are packing,” Valdez nodding at the rifle in Kirk’s hands. “The second 
thing is that those engines are going to need a water source once they get to work. If we 
leave Jamison Creek Road open to you headed east, we won’t be able to bring water in that 
way, and it will take too long to move them around to the west side. How about you let us 
use your stock pond and spring to refill our trucks?” 
“Huh, that sounds like a pretty good deal for you, deputy,” Armstrong retorted, his 
hands tightening on the rifle. 
“Wait, wait, wait,” Ryan interceded, “listen, with all or most of your cattle gone, 
you won’t need all the water. Dan Johnson, the BLM officer, has agreed that once you’re 
out of here, he will call for the BLM water tenders to start refilling your stock pond. You 
won’t even know it is gone! Dan and I will stay with you or your father as long as you are 
still here. Anything you need or want, or if something is not going how we said, we will be 
right with you to take care of it immediately. You still have control. Kirk, this is the best 
solution for you and your family right now. Please, work with us on this,” Ryan concluded. 
Armstrong left for several minutes and was clearly talking with those back at the 
ranch. When he returned, he said, “Ok, your plan seems pretty reasonable. No one will 
interfere with your firefighters, Tom. We have one condition. I know that your Hi-Po buddy 
has stopped several of our neighbors back there at County Road 3. If you let them in here, 
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we will be able to leave more quickly. Let them come down to help us, and we have a deal 
as long as you promise to refill the pond when this thing is over.” 
Ryan looked up and said, “That works for me, Kirk. Does that work for you, 
deputy?” 
“That seems fair enough. I’ll call back and have Huston send them this way. Thanks 
for being reasonable. Tell your dad I appreciate it,” Valdez said.  
As they started back up the road to let the others know how to proceed, Valdez felt 
as if a potential disaster had been averted. “I sure am glad that you happened along, Tom,” 
he told Ryan. “These guys don’t take well to orders from strangers, and they don’t like law 
enforcement. But hey, who doesn’t love a fireman?” 
“Yeah,” Ryan replied, “I don’t think that message would have been as well received 
from Dan or your Highway Patrol buddy. Let’s go tell everyone that it is finally time to get 
to work.” 
In the end, the fireline cut in by the bulldozer and the strike force fire engines were 
able to save all of the homes and ranches in Jamison Creek. The Armstrongs were charged 
with multiple counts of obstructing a peace officer and are awaiting trial. 
A. ANALYSIS 
This scenario, like the first, has illustrated the convergence of not only people and 
materiel but also challenges facing law enforcement, fire departments, and EMS providers 
in the wake of expanded gun ownership, right-to-carry, and stand-your-ground laws. This 
second scenario has also demonstrated the problems associated with the disaster 
convergence of armed individuals. In this scenario, the ranchers and neighbors of the 
Armstrongs represent internal convergers determined to act as helpers. It could be argued 
that in such a setting, these convergers initially present a high degree of legitimacy as the 
idea of neighbors helping neighbors is a rich tradition in America. However, the initial 
legitimacy of these convergers diminishes significantly when their actions interfere with 
the organized response efforts of proper authorities. 
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A second and potentially more problematic issue, implied by Kendra and 
Wachtendorf’s thoughts on legitimacy and convergence, arises when convergers believe 
that the legitimacy of their actions outweighs the legitimacy of proper authorities. Such a 
condition is more likely to develop when convergers do not trust authorities’ motivations 
or competency. As previously described, citizens’ distrust in the motivation or competency 
of the authorities was likely responsible for the convergence of armed supporters to Cliven 
Bundy’s ranch in 2014 and the decision by many New Orleans residents not to follow 
mandatory evacuation orders in the face of Hurricane Katrina. The problem for authorities 
becomes even more complex when either convergers or residents have both firearms and 
what they believe to be the moral high ground to resist or interfere with the government’s 
response to crisis events. Under these conditions, it is foreseeable that gun owners’ frontier 
mentality, bias for action, and perceived moral high ground would create a dangerous 
environment for public safety officers and other members of the public. 
The resolution in the preceding scenario points to several possible strategic, 
operational, and tactical solutions to these challenges. First, by understanding and 
addressing the needs of residents and convergers—in this case, the rescue of the rancher’s 
means of livelihood—the authorities were able to secure their cooperation and create a 
win-win resolution. Second, by having a person whom the ranchers knew and trusted 
present the cooperative plan, the authorities were able to dispel distrust in the authorities’ 
motivations and competency, which may be present in many different communities. 
Finally, through negotiation and de-escalation, the authorities were able to avoid a violent 
encounter with the very people they were attempting to help. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the expansion of right-to-carry and stand-your-ground laws in 
America have foundational roots in natural disasters. The government’s failure to 
adequately or equitably respond to these disasters has added fuel to the armed-citizen 
movement. A poor understanding, miscommunication, and misapplication of relevant laws 
have impacted citizens’ trust of the government and its intentions regarding gun ownership. 
This combination of issues has dramatically increased the probability of public safety 
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responders encountering armed citizens who may be distrustful of their organization’s 
motives or abilities. The growth in the number of armed citizens has also changed the 
dynamic for public safety officers by further complicating their response even to routine 
incidents. Strategic, operational, and tactical changes in how public safety officers respond 
to these calls should be examined and implemented as a result of this evolving landscape.  
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VI. THE PUBLIC SAFETY RESPONSE TO CONVERGENCE AND 
INCREASED GUN-CARRYING IN AMERICA 
Natural and man-made disasters have altered the public safety paradigm. Hurricane 
Katrina and Sandy Hook changed how public safety agencies and their employees need to 
plan for the presence of armed citizens since initiatives such as right-to-carry and stand-
your-ground laws were solidified and expanded after Hurricane Katrina. Calls for the 
arming of school staff after Sandy Hook continue today and, where such policies are 
implemented, will complicate law enforcement’s job when responding to similar events. 
On the surface, topics such as disaster convergence, right-to-carry/stand-your-
ground, armed school staff, and man-made and natural disasters may appear disparate. 
However, emergency managers, public safety officials, and politicians may find 
themselves in situations where these issues and the policies surrounding them intersect. 
The scenarios contained in Chapters IV and V were designed to illustrate some of these 
intersections. While it may be tempting to disregard these scenarios because of differences 
in locale or situation, both outline issues that public safety officers experience routinely 
and the ways in which the combination of issues necessitates changes in public safety 
organizations’ strategic, operational, and tactical planning.  
A. FINDINGS 
Of the issues examined in this thesis, disaster convergence is probably the best 
studied. However, remarkably few planning documents appear to consider the convergence 
of armed citizens. These armed citizens may fit within any of Fritz and Mathewson’s 
categories of convergers, which means they will be searching for a variety of things or 
conditions to meet their needs. Furthermore, these convergers will display varying degrees 
of legitimacy. For example, armed citizens or off-duty law enforcement may move toward 
the sound of gunfire, acting as helpers at the scene of a shooting. While the legitimacy of 
an off-duty law enforcement officer may be greater than that of a CCW holder, both are  
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attempting to fulfill the need for helping. Despite their varying levels of legitimacy, the 
presence of off-duty law enforcement and armed citizens will dramatically complicate 
matters for law enforcement, fire, and EMS, who must determine whether these helpers 
pose a threat to them. 
Armed citizen intervention at mass shootings—ranging from the University of 
Texas in 1966 to the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, in 2017—shows 
that armed citizens are likely to converge on violent incidents and that their assistance can 
help protect others at such events.277 Conversely, the presence of armed supporters has 
complicated public safety officials’ roles, causing them to postpone legitimate public safety 
operations or withdraw personnel due to escalated tensions, for example, the incidents at 
the Bundy Ranch, at Ruby Ridge, and in Charlottesville.278 
Meanwhile, right-to-carry laws have led to an explosion in the number of armed 
citizens in the United States. The expansion of stand-your-ground laws has loosened the 
rules of engagement for armed citizens. Simultaneously, these laws make the investigation 
and any subsequent prosecution of negligent shooters difficult or impossible for law 
enforcement. These laws complicate law enforcement and public safety officials’ jobs by 
increasing the number of interactions with armed individuals and the likelihood of errors 
in split-second decision making. Errors in this type of decision making could result in the 
death or injury of either law enforcement officers or otherwise law-abiding citizens. 
 
 
277 On August 1, 1966, campus bookstore manager Allen Crum accompanied two Austin police 
officers up the steps of the clock tower at the University of Texas and assisted them in neutralizing Charles 
Whitman, who had already killed 16 people and wounded 30 more in what was the first mass shooting at an 
American university. Crum was not the only armed civilian to converge on the University of Texas that 
day. In November 2017, Steven Willeford used his AR-15 to wound a gunman murdering parishioners at 
the First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, TX. Willeford’s intervention is credited with causing the 
gunman to stop shooting and attempt to escape. The wounded gunman then committed suicide. 
278 Ribando, Reinke, and Gorectke, “In the Crosshairs”; and Sam Jackson, “Don’t Assume the Militias 
at the Charlottesville Rally Were White Supremacists: This Is What They Believe Now,” Washington Post, 
September 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/08/remember-those-
militias-at-the-charlottesville-unite-the-right-rally-heres-what-they-believe/. At each of these events, large 
numbers of armed supporters either directly interfered with law enforcement or made it difficult for public 
safety officials to determine “good guys” from “bad guys.”  
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Public safety officials must build and maintain the trust of the jurisdictions they 
protect and have a solid understanding of local priorities and citizen concerns. Ignoring 
these problems will magnify challenges for officials during crisis events, especially since 
increases in gun ownership can be linked to the public perception that law enforcement and 
the government are ineffective.279 If, for instance, crime is particularly high in an area, and 
the citizens begin to feel they have been ignored by law enforcement, depending on the 
local culture, it may be reasonable to expect armed citizens to be present or, worse yet, start 
taking matters into their own hands. This “trading of the police for a gun” may represent 
the ultimate failure of public safety organizations to earn and retain the citizens’ trust.280 
Calls for the arming of school staff continue to blur the responsibilities of teachers 
and other educators. Proponents of such policies argue that arming school staff is an 
economical way to deter or respond to school shootings. Opponents of such policies 
question whether school staff members can attain the proper level of training to counter an 
armed individual safely. Additionally, these opponents raise valid concerns about the risks 
and liabilities that armed school staff take on themselves and bring to school districts. 
Finally, challenges may also exist for school districts regarding insurance and 
indemnification in light of proposals to arm their staff. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING DISASTER CONVERGENCE 
The most significant opportunity for strategic-level enhancements lies in pre-crisis 
event planning that accounts for the convergence of people, materiel, and information. 
With this in mind, public safety officials’ preplanning efforts should focus on two areas: 
the decentralization of emergency resources and the plans to meet the varying needs of 
convergers. A third consideration, directly related to but independent of convergence, is 
disaster communications. 
 
279 Drake, “The Castle Doctrine,” 597. 
280 Drake, 595–96. 
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Decentralizing resources is one of the key recommendations for avoiding the 
congestion of vehicles, people, and resources.281 For example, establishing multiple 
casualty collection points (CCPs), rather than just one, at the scene of an active shooter 
eases traffic congestion and hastens patient transportation. Such an arrangement may also 
facilitate more rapid triage and treatment of victims given the smaller number of patients 
at each collection point. Reducing the number of victims at a single CCP may also improve 
responders’ ability to track patients and maintain accountability. Finally, such an 
arrangement may assist incident commanders by minimizing span-of-control issues 
stemming from a single but overwhelmed CCP. 
Some potential disadvantages could present themselves if the decentralization of 
resources, such as CCPs, is not considered during strategic planning for such an event. For 
instance, the presence of multiple CCPs necessitates an adequate number of responders to 
staff them, as well as enhanced situational awareness on the part of responders as to the 
location and capabilities of separate CCPs. In environments where a shooter is still at large, 
multiple CCPs may present security issues due to a lack of available law enforcement 
personnel. In the end, proper prior planning will likely determine the effectiveness of the 
decentralization of resources in a mass casualty environment. 
Addressing the needs of convergers based on the legitimacy of their purpose offers 
the most powerful method for minimizing and controlling convergence. For example, both 
the media and family members of potential victims have strong claims of legitimacy at a 
mass shooting. However, these two types of convergers have different needs. Using the 
active shooter scenario in Chapter IV as an example, incident commanders will likely 
benefit from preplanning of a specific location outside the disaster zone for the media to 
receive updates. Additionally, designating a family reunification location in a place 
separate from the media, and outside the disaster zone, will provide for family privacy 
while helping alleviate overcrowding and congestion in the disaster zone. 
 
 
281 Fritz and Mathewson, Convergence Behaviors in Disasters, 82–83. 
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Public safety agency leaders will undoubtedly focus much of their attention on the 
target of an active shooter. However, they must also consider the security at other target 
hazards. Hospitals receiving victims from such an attack are likely to be overwhelmed by 
victims, family members, bystanders, and possibly other attackers. At the strategic level, 
emergency service leaders must plan for convergers at these locations as well. Possible 
strategic planning should include deploying law enforcement to these locations for 
additional security. Fire and EMS leaders should consider sending off-duty or mutual aid 
personnel to these same receiving facilities to assist with the treatment and internal 
transport of victims. 
The most challenging aspect in the implementation of such plans is likely to be 
timing and staffing challenges. Depending on the size of the event, initial responders will 
likely be overwhelmed by the immediate tasks required to stabilize the incident. The 
overwhelming nature of the initial response to a crisis event may prevent an incident 
commander from having the time or resources to consider where to deploy incoming 
resources. Additionally, the immediate life-safety needs of the incident may leave limited 
personnel available to establish media and family reunification areas. By the time such 
personnel are available, many convergers may have already arrived on the incident. 
Furthermore, the very nature of convergence may prevent those designated with these 
responsibilities from arriving at the incident promptly due to overcrowded access points. 
The best way to mitigate these challenges comes in the form of strategic preplanning and 
the advance assignment of critical roles such as media communications and predetermined 
family reunification facilities. 
Communications during a crisis event serve many purposes. One of the essential 
functions of prompt and accurate communications will be to minimize the impact of 
convergence. In this era of near-instantaneous communications through both social and 
traditional media, there are numerous outlets available to transmit information that were 
unimaginable to Fritz and Mathewson in 1957. However, what remains constant is the need 
for specific information. As such, those charged with the dissemination of information  
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must be both technically savvy with social media tools and empowered to have and release 
specific information as it becomes available. Agencies should preselect a public 
information officer and ensure that this individual receives the appropriate training 
encompassing these duties. Preplanning should entail not only who the designated public 
information officer is, but how he or she will be notified and by whom, and for what type 
of events. 
At the operational level, disaster convergence can be managed by understanding 
not only that convergence will occur but also that the majority of human influx and outflow 
from disaster sites will be through “voluntary and unofficial movement”—not through 
means provided by the government.282 Additionally, traditional methods of restricting 
movement within a disaster site may be invalid, doing little to stem the flow of 
convergers.283 The establishment of decentralized triage and CCPs may serve to minimize 
the internal convergence of the less injured at hospitals already struggling to care for the 
more critically injured.  
In order to reduce the number of external convergers, best practices established by 
authorities should eliminate the need to move toward a disaster site. Through the 
implementation of the communication strategies discussed above, public safety officials 
can begin addressing the needs of would-be convergers before they arrive. By broadcasting 
the locations of media staging areas, family reunification locations, and the defined 
perimeter of the event, officials can direct the convergence of people and materiel to 
designated locations and away from the disaster site. One possible example of addressing 
and redirecting the needs of convergers following an active shooter event is to establish an 
offsite location for blood or other donations. Such a location should be outside the disaster 




282 Fritz and Mathewson, 79. 
283 Fritz and Mathewson, 76–83. 
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When faced with a crisis event, most public safety agencies will likely be 
overwhelmed during the response phase. As such, they will likely have to rely on mutual 
aid compacts. Examples of this include fire, EMS, and law enforcement assistance from 
neighboring cities and towns. Additional examples may include assistance from 
street/traffic departments, public health departments, and state or federal law enforcement 
agencies. This expanded response framework will likely introduce new players to the 
scenario at the least opportune time. As such, these responders may be unfamiliar with 
local policies and procedures and local organizational structures. Disaster planners may 
best mitigate these challenges during preplanning events such as drills and table-top or 
functional exercises. One resource for building these relationships is through active 
participation in local emergency planning commissions or similar “whole community” 
planning groups in addition to discipline-specific groups such as fire-councils or law 
enforcement task forces. 
At the tactical level, convergence must not only be considered but managed. Using 
the previous active shooter scenario, law enforcement officers who are not directly 
involved in the delivery of emergency services, such as those from outside jurisdictions, 
should be used to secure site perimeters or reinforce other security assets at critical 
infrastructure such as hospitals. Fire and EMS personnel responding from other agencies 
or who are off duty should be deployed to CCPs, triage areas, or hospitals, especially when 
the number of casualties exceeds local resources. The implementation of a well-organized 
staging area for ambulances, buses, or other means of transportation for the injured should 
be considered essential. Finally, the realization by responders that many of the victims of 
mass casualty events will self-refer to medical facilities should deter the need to stop those 
fleeing the disaster site. 
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• Anticipate the influx of people, materiel, and information 
in disaster preplanning. 
• Recognize the varying needs of convergers. Make plans 
to address these needs. 
• When possible, preplan for the decentralization of critical 
resources such as triage and field-care facilities. 
• Preplan disaster communication procedures. Designate a 
social-media savvy PIO in advance. 
Operational 
Recommendations 
• Locate media areas outside the disaster zone but, when 
possible, in such a location where the media can observe 
the disaster. 
• Locate the family reunification facility outside the 
disaster zone and separate from the media reporting area. 
• Recognize that the majority of internal convergence will 
occur outside official channels or means. 
• Establish a clear means of identifying legitimate 
personnel entering or within the disaster zone. 
Tactical 
Recommendations 
• Consider directing converging law enforcement officers 
to perimeter security and infrastructure (e.g., hospital or 
another soft target) protection. 
• In mass casualty incidents, consider directing converging 
fire/EMS personnel to hospital/triage-treatment-transport 
facilities. 
• Establish and maintain clear routes for emergency 
vehicles.  
• Disseminate information promptly and frequently, even if 
information is not complete or verified. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERACTING WITH ARMED CITIZENS 
The interaction between public safety officers and armed citizens is another area 
that can likely be improved by preplanning and effective strategic communication. Wood 
asserts that for law enforcement and public safety agencies, the most challenging 
adjustments in interacting with armed citizens will be at the strategic level, and 
improvements may only come from a cultural change in those agencies.284 An example of 
strategic messaging that has likely fostered gun owners’ distrust in government comes from 
Chief Michel Moore of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Chief Moore recently 
moved to revoke a handful of Los Angeles residents’ CCW permits granted to them under 
the terms of a lawsuit in 1994.285 Chief Moore’s actions are in stark contrast to those of 
Chief Joseph P. LaSata of the city of Rockledge, Florida. Under Chief LaSata, the 
Rockledge Police Department has developed a strategic messaging document for CCW 
holders that not only affirms the rights of Florida citizens possessing CCWs but 
acknowledges the many requirements that Florida citizens undergo to be licensed.286 
Furthermore, Chief LaSata has provided CCW holders with insight into the dangerous jobs 
that law enforcement have as they pertain to interacting with armed citizens as well as 
proactive advice for how to safely and politely interact with law enforcement officers.287 
These two polar approaches send very different messages to armed citizens. The 
approach of the LAPD and Chief Moore likely create an adversarial environment for armed 
citizens in these communities and do little to encourage responsible gun ownership. 
Conversely, Chief LaSata’s approach at least sends a message acknowledging the realities 
 
284 Mike Wood, personal communication, March 29, 2019. Wood believes that in the past, some police 
agencies trained their personnel to perceive only two types of people with firearms: criminals and the 
police. He also believes that this distinction has created a culture of “exclusivity” for law enforcement 
officers with regard to firearms. Until a cultural change is made within these organizations, Wood has 
reservations about such agencies having the capacity to adopt SOPs, tactics, and training to accommodate 
the presence of lawfully armed citizens. 
285 Eric Leonard, “LAPD Asks to Cancel Citizens’ Concealed Weapons Permits,” NBC Southern 
California, March 28, 2019, https://www.nbclosangeles.com/investigations/LAPD-Asks-to-Cancel-
Citizens-Concealed-Weapons-Permits-507815711.html. 
286 Joseph P. LaSata, “Law Enforcement Interactions with Florida Concealed Weapon and Firearms 




of shall-issue Florida while providing actionable advice to gun owners to enhance their 
safety and that of any law enforcement officers with whom they may come into contact. 
Regardless of one’s opinion on concealed firearm practices, Chief Moore’s attitude toward 
legacy CCW licensees casts doubt on the likelihood of operational or tactical initiatives 
being implemented in the LAPD to effectively communicate with CCW holders or the gun-
owning public at large. Positive strategic messaging, such as that of Chief LaSata, should 
be considered by other law enforcement agencies, especially those in shall-issue and 
constitutional-carry states that require no permit or license whatsoever to possess a 
concealed weapon. 
Public safety agencies have a strong history of community outreach to diverse 
enclaves within them. Public safety agencies should consider treating gun-owners the same 
way they do racial or ethnic subsets in their respective communities. Community-based 
participatory research (CBPR) is a methodology already employed by many public safety 
agencies that could be adapted to increase communication with firearm owners.288 
Traditionally, CBPR efforts may take the form of community advisory boards where 
cultural knowledge is imparted and transparency is demonstrated.289 CBPR is different 
from other methodologies in that it “fosters social change.”290 By utilizing CBPR or other 
community policing strategies with gun owners, public safety agencies can build bonds of 
trust with gun owners. Public safety agencies should engage the gun-owning community 
to better understand the incidence of local gun ownership and the motivational factors 
behind it. This engagement will help agencies build plans for how to best interact with gun 
owners. 
If these concepts are taken to the next level, law enforcement agencies may opt to 
participate actively in the education of CCW permit applicants and establish a presence at 
local gun clubs and organized shooting events. Fire departments and EMS agencies could 
likewise build relationships with the gun-owning public by offering first aid classes 
 
288 Cordasco et al., “‘They Blew the Levee,’” 280. 
289 Cordasco et al., 280. 
290 Cordasco et al., 280. 
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specific to gun-owners such as stop-the-bleed trauma care at similar events.291 By 
involving themselves with the gun-owning community, law enforcement and other public 
safety officers can demonstrate that they are not the enemy of CCW permit holders and 
dispel further notions of distrust in the government that these citizens may harbor. This 
enhancement of relations between both parties may create the two-way information 
network that other community policing initiatives have created in different communities. 
Now more than ever, responders need to anticipate the presence of armed citizens 
while responding to calls. Like law enforcement, fire and EMS officers should couple this 
understanding with a firm understanding of local, state, and federal gun laws to provide 
responders with appropriate legal boundaries for their actions. Remaining aware and 
respectful of these laws may be one of the best ways for law enforcement and emergency 
services personnel to earn and retain the citizens’ trust. Furthermore, all public safety 
officers should understand the climate surrounding guns in their operational area. As the 
news headlines demonstrate daily, there is a significant difference in each of these factors 
from urban Los Angeles to rural Colorado.292 
Awareness of the growing numbers of good guys with guns should drive a training 
regimen on how to identify and communicate with armed citizens during a violent incident. 
For example, encountering an armed individual displaying safe gun-handling techniques 
may indicate a level of training that would be uncommon for a criminal. The presence of a 
handgun holster or a spare magazine may likewise be indicative of a trained CCW holder. 
The reactions of bystanders to an armed individual can likewise provide insight into the 
armed individual’s intent. While none of these individual factors rules out criminal intent, 
the totality of the circumstances will likely provide public safety officers with valuable 
information regarding the individual’s intentions. 
 
291 Stop-the-bleed trauma care is a grassroots educational campaign that trains bystanders to minimize 
bleeding in trauma victims before first responders arrive.  
292 Leonard, “LAPD Asks to Cancel Citizens’ Concealed Weapons Permits”; and Daniel Trotta, 
“Defiant U.S. Sheriffs Push Gun Sanctuaries, Imitating Liberals on Immigration,” Reuters, March 5, 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-sanctuary-idUSKCN1QL0ZC. 
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Fire and EMS responders should likewise understand that the presence of an armed 
citizen does not necessarily indicate hostile or criminal intentions. Quite possibly, reacting 
to armed citizens in such a manner could unintentionally escalate a situation or create a 
counter-productive division between patient and health care provider. In the end, regardless 
of one’s opinion about right-to-carry or stand-your-ground laws, the principles of trust 
between gun owners and public safety officers are the same as they would be with any 
other community.  





• Perform a cultural evaluation of agency and community 
opinions on armed-citizen issues such as right-to-carry and 
stand-your-ground. 
• Develop a specific policy for interacting with armed 
citizens. 
• Consider implementing a strategic messaging program to 
communicate with armed citizens. 
Operational 
Recommendations 
• Incorporate armed-citizen interactions in table-top and 
functional exercises. 
• Develop and implement community-based policing 
initiatives targeted on the gun-owning community. 
• Develop and deliver an “interacting with the police” 
educational program to be delivered at CCW training 
events. 
• Develop and implement stop-the-bleed or CPR classes for 
focused delivery to the gun-owning community. 
Tactical 
Recommendations 
• Ensure that public safety officers are educated in 
applicable gun-related local, state, and federal laws and are 
committed to upholding citizens’ rights. 
• Incorporate armed-citizen identification/interaction 
scenarios during ongoing training evolutions. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING ARMED SCHOOL 
STAFF  
At the strategic level, school district officials and parental organizations have some 
tough decisions to make about how best to secure their schools. Certainly, a trend has been 
to harden school facilities with added security such as video cameras, metal detectors, and 
locked facilities.293 Other options have historically included the implementation of armed 
law enforcement or private security on school grounds.294 However, both Columbine High 
School and Marjorie Stoneman High School employed varying levels of these security 
measures with little success.295 Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the efficacy of 
arming schools.296 
One thing does seem clear: the armed school-staff debate is here to stay. School 
districts considering such a policy must have open discussions with all stakeholders, 
especially law enforcement—who will likely play a vital role in the training of school staff 
if such a policy were to advance. The application of Jones’s Risk Acceptance Matrix and 
Decision Framework for Determining Concealed Weapons Policy in California K-12 
Schools should provide excellent guidance for school districts considering such an 
option.297 These tools will allow those in leadership positions to make educated decisions 
on risk acceptance and policy matters should they choose to move forward with arming 
staff members. By introducing this information during the planning phase, public safety 
agencies can actively engage stakeholders while providing jurisdiction-specific input such 
as legal considerations and agency response protocols. This interaction will undoubtedly 
form the basis for operational and tactical procedures that should follow. These tools may 
 
293 DeMitchell, “Locked Down and Armed,” 284–85. 
294 Kupchik, Brent, and Mowen, “The Aftermath of Newton,” 1118; and David Moye, “Florida School 
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prove to be useful not only for schools but for other organizations such as churches or 
businesses that are considering arming members of their staff.  
The challenges faced by public safety officers who are responsible for protecting 
schools or other infrastructure defended by a cadre of armed civilians are extensions of the 
challenges faced in working with armed citizens. At the strategic level, public safety 
organizations need to take an active role in the development and implementation of such 
programs.  
Critics and proponents of arming school staff cite training as the most important 
factor in implementing an armed school staff program.298 School systems that choose to 
implement an armed staff program need to build strong relationships with law enforcement 
to assist them in the training of staff. When possible, simulation-based training should be 
incorporated in addition to basic gun handling and fixed target shooting. Law enforcement 
organizations may already possess the equipment to facilitate this type of training and will 
be invaluable to schools pursuing an armed-staff program. Regardless of what type of 
training is implemented, strong law enforcement relationships, developed in advance of an 
incident, can provide both school staff and law enforcement foundational relationships 
necessary to work together through an understanding of each party’s roles, responsibilities, 
and capabilities.  
Similar to the manner that fire departments conduct business inspections, law 
enforcement needs to conduct site surveys of target hazards and help either to establish or 
to train in-house security teams. Fire and EMS agencies should also consider the 
development and implementation of stop-the-bleed or tactical emergency casualty care 
first-aid classes, focusing specifically on the types of injuries that stem from active shooter 
incidents. Not only should all responders be trained in such measures, but these courses 
should also be offered to the staff of target hazards, such as schools and arenas, and be 
made available to the public at large. Table-top and functional exercises provide additional 
opportunities for both responders and armed staff members to test and evaluate their plans 
and to develop a high degree of trust in each other. The participation of standard patrol 
 
298 Winston, “Equipping Teachers with Firearms,” 43; and Weatherby, “Opening the ‘Snake Pit,’” 141. 
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officers, not just highly trained SWAT officers, will increase the realism of such exercises 
and may reveal true gaps in the knowledge and training of responding personnel. 
Training, communications, and mutual understanding should form the basis for 
operational considerations at facilities with armed civilian staff members. Where possible, 
public safety agencies should attempt to deliver discipline-specific training to these staff 
members. This training could be as in-depth as simulation-based firearm training and first-
aid training or as simple as training for safety and security inspections of facilities. 
Whatever the intensity of the training, the purpose is for both responders and armed staff 
members to learn as much as possible about each other’s capabilities, roles, and 
responsibilities.  
The success of tactical operations at facilities with armed staff members will most 
likely depend on the successes or failures occurring at the strategic and operational levels. 
It is unrealistic for either party to expect good outcomes from poorly conceived or poorly 
implemented policies. Tactical considerations, therefore, should focus on the consistent 
application of policies and procedures developed before a violent incident. Settings where 
armed staff members and public safety officers meet for the first time with guns drawn and 
tensions elevated would appear to be the most dangerous type of interaction and a recipe 
for disaster. Proactive public safety officials should do everything in their power to prevent 
this scenario from unfolding. 
In schools where armed staff and SROs are present, it will be critical for the SRO 
to know who is armed, where they are located, what the deployment arrangement is—either 
defensive, shelter in place or offensive, move to the sound of gunfire—and what the 
activation criteria are for an armed staff member. Ideally, the SRO and all armed staff 
members will have trained together. Plans must also include how armed staff can 
communicate safely and efficiently with responding law enforcement agencies, especially 
in the absence of a sworn SRO. Equally important is the implementation of a code-word, 
visual means of identification, or other ways for armed school staff to safely identify 
themselves to law enforcement and emergency service personnel. 
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Table 3. Assisting with an Armed School Staff Program 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, natural and man-made disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina and 
Sandy Hook, have altered the nature of gun ownership in America. Events such as these 
have created and expanded gun-related phenomena such as right-to-carry and stand-your-
ground laws. They have also decreased the public’s trust in all levels of government to 
protect them, thereby encouraging more and more Americans to buy guns and obtain CCW 
permits. When these trends are factored into known disaster responses, such as that of 




• Form a strong relationship with a prospective school 
district early in its examination of an armed-staff policy. 
• Assist with a cultural and risk assessment of prospective 
school districts and the community. 




• Assist with training of armed staff members. 
• Incorporate situation-based training using simulated 
munitions in addition to static range-based weapons 
training. 
• Deliver facility-focused stop-the-bleed and CPR training 
to all staff members. 
• Conduct table-top and functional exercises with line law 
enforcement officers, not just SWAT. 
Tactical 
Recommendations 
• Identify armed school-staff members and maintain a 
working relationship with them. 
• Define armed-staff response expectations (defensive 
only or defensive/offensive). 
• Establish an interoperable communications system with 
school staff, especially armed school staff. 
• Implement visual and audible identification friend-or-foe 
(IFF) procedures. 
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enforcement, fire, and EMS become more complicated and potentially more dangerous 
than ever before. 
Forward-thinking public safety leaders must consider how to implement strategic, 
operational, and tactical changes in response to these gun-related changes in America. 
What these changes will be and how they will be implemented will almost certainly depend 
on the underlying culture of each jurisdiction. In areas where stringent gun laws may 
restrict the public from frequently possessing, carrying, and using firearms, officials must 
at least understand these trends and be prepared to respond to them within their context. In 
suburban or rural areas or locales with few firearm restrictions, public safety officials must 
not only recognize gun-related changes in culture but preferably find proactive measures 
to work with gun owners, not against them—to better develop trust and dispel suspicion.  
This thesis has focused primarily on the evolution of armed citizens and their 
interaction with public safety officers armed during crisis events. Future work in the area 
of convergence of armed individuals to crisis events should address policies and procedures 
for safe and effective deployment of uniformed and plain-clothes armed public safety 
officers. Another possibility for future research in the area of armed school staff would 
entail a study of students’ and parents’ perceptions of the impact of armed SROs, school 
guards, or armed staff on the educational environment. 
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